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Abstract 
Since the beginning of its existence, ASEAN has aimed at promoting regional social, cultural 
and economic cooperation between the member states. ASEAN’s advances in both trade and 
regional influence have been recognized by China, Japan, and South Korea. The rise in those 
three states’ interest in collaboration with ASEAN was also helped by the fact, that most of 
all the involved states share a common history and culture. Therefore, ASEAN+3 has been 
formed. The region’s shared use of the ‘ASEAN way’ and ‘non-confrontation’ have distinct 
features. In order to ascertain what determinants make up trade regionalism in ASEAN+3, 
this project make use of the ‘new regionalism approach’ together with process tracing. In 
addition, Kopstein & Lichbach’s theoretical approach of ‘Identity, Interests, and Institutions’, 
is used as the main way of identifying and analyzing the determinants of new trade 
regionalism in ASEAN+3. 
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Problem Area 
All the countries in the world are having much more and faster contact with each other. States 
have access to products, ideas, and culture, from a whole world of markets. Investments, 
capital, and trade transactions are being done at a breathtaking speed all across a multitude of 
borders. It is not always apparent where one business starts and where one state, or 
organization ends. Economic growth has become paramount in a globalized world. The 
international market affects many aspects of a state's business, economics, and socio-cultural 
aspects, generating an interdependence between economic and cultural activities.  
Because of this, it has become prudent to try to secure one’s own state’s economy the best 
possible way. When concerning trade, the strategies are many; from tariffs, import quotas, to 
free trade agreements. A way that might encompass all these aspects, and more, is the way of 
regionalism. Since the early 1990s the initiatives to develop regional institutions have 
intensified on a global scale, as can be seen in the European Union (EU), North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mercosur, the African Union, and the Association of 
Southeast Nations - better known as ASEAN. 
Particularly ASEAN stands out, because of its massive growth within the past 10 years, as the 
region has managed to double the size of its economy within that time, and it is now the 
seventh-largest economy in the world (ASEAN-FACT, 2014). ASEAN also has the third-
largest labor force in the world, behind China and India (ibid.). The ten members of ASEAN; 
Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Burma/Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Vietnam, have combined a GDP larger than India, and the region is predicted 
to exceed the Japanese GDP in 2028 (ASEAN-INVEST, 2013). When considering the words 
of Shaun Narine: [i]t is important to recognize ASEAN’s achievements as a collection of 
relative weak states in the developing world (2001: 6), the economic accomplishments of 
ASEAN become more impressive. As an economic force, ASEAN has started playing an 
important role in regional trade. 
ASEAN also differs in another way. Traditionally, in regional integration, such as in the EU, 
the member states transfer much of their sovereignty to the region’s leading organ. Yet, 
despite having a huge historical influence from Europe, the Southeast Asian states differ as 
the ASEAN member states do not transfer nearly as much sovereignty to the leading ASEAN 
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agency compared to the EU. Instead, the regional interstate-relations have been characterized 
by a multitude of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs).  
ASEAN’s advances in both trade and regional influence have been recognized by the 
international community, particularly by some nearby states, such as China, Japan, and South 
Korea. So much so, that China, Japan, and South Korea have started, what can be only 
described as a ‘race’, to acquire more advantageous FTAs with ASEAN than the others, in 
order to gain the upper hand in regional trade. The rise in those three states’ interest in 
collaboration with ASEAN was also helped by the fact, that most of all the involved states 
shared a common history and culture. Then, after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, the need 
for more cooperation between Asian states became abundantly clear for the involved parties, 
Therefore, more regionalization took place, and ASEAN+3 was formed. 
The concept of regionalism is not a novel concept, nor is ASEAN for that matter - as it was 
originally established in 1967. What is distinct, is the way to analyze contemporary 
regionalism. For a long time, the analytical approach to regionalism was the search for a 
single theoretical explanation. Especially, understanding regions from a geographical point of 
view has been in the high seat. However, with the rise of speedy trade across borders, in a 
time where geography has a lot less to say, the old way of analyzing regionalism seems 
insufficient. The new way to analyze regionalism seems to take more aspects into 
consideration, which is needed when investigating the many factors that make up a region the 
size of ASEAN+3. In addition, according to Mely Carballero-Anthony (2008), the formal 
adoption of the ASEAN Charter in 2007, led to a new era of regionalism in Southeast Asia 
(2008: 74). The ‘ASEAN way’ and its ‘non-confrontational’ norms has been claimed to be a 
driving factor in reaching agreements between the ASEAN+3 member states. But what does 
that entail? And how does such a huge region as ASEAN+3, which consists of thirteen 
different states, become united enough to agree on trade? Without a clear official leading 
organ, one would imagine that reaching a consensus between so many states would be 
difficult. And, do the citizens of the different states view themselves as citizens of the region? 
With a new approach to analyzing regionalism, is it possible to identify what determines 
trade regionalism in ASEAN+3?  
It was these considerations which have led us to the following problem formulation and 
working questions: 
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Problem Formulation:  
What are the determinants of new trade regionalism in ASEAN+3? 
Working Question 1:  
Looking at domestic identities, to what extent can one talk of an ASEAN+3 identity? 
Working Question 2:  
How do national interests determine trade regionalism in ASEAN+3? 
Working Question 3:  
To what extent do institutions play a role in trade regionalism in ASEAN+3? 
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Theoretical Framework 
In this section we will first provide an overview of definitions, which we consider crucial for 
this study. Following, we will give an introduction to the two waves of regionalism, referred 
to as ‘old’ and ‘new’ regionalism. Lastly we will explain our theoretical framework based on 
Kopstein and Lichbach’s theory on identities, interests, and institutions. 
Definitions 
In order to study the process of creating collective identity and shaping international 
economic integration, it is crucial to first provide the definition of what is meant by region. 
Different perspectives on mechanisms and drivers for regions development, influence the 
study of regionalism and can highly affect the outcomes of the research. Therefore, this 
section will provide a brief overview of how regions are perceived in the relevant literature 
and clarify which definition we are referring to throughout this project. Furthermore, a 
distinction between regionalism and regionalization will be provided, in order to explain 
which aspects of the regional integration we chose to look at.  
Region 
During the early debate a great focus was put on finding a scientific definition of regions. A 
number of discrepancies between influential factors occurred, as it remained unknown which 
ones played a significant role in the development of regions. Considerations involved all of 
the possible variables, from mutual interdependence to social and cultural factors. However, 
these attempts to define what constituted a region did not produce tangible results until years 
after. The new wave of regionalism, which began after the end of the Cold War, brought a 
new range of perspectives on the concept of region. They differ significantly in terms of basic 
assumptions regarding the origins and development of regions (Söderbaum, 2011; Breslin, 
Higgott & Rosamond 2002). 
It seems exceptionally difficult to extract what constitutes a region. In a general 
understanding regions are understood as [...] groups of countries located in the same 
geographic space (Mansfield & Solingen, 2010: 146). However, studies on regions and 
regionalism challenge this way of thinking about regions, arguing that unclear physical 
borders cannot alone define the territory which falls into a region (Breslin, Higgott & 
Rosamond, 2002; Mansfield & Solingen, 2010). Therefore, regions are not only built on 
Katarzyna Magda Tarasiewicz, Rikke Lykke Andersen, Emil Matthews, Nikolaj Gedionsen  
Bachelor-project, Spring 2015 
International Studies  
Roskilde University 
Page 10 of 73 
geographical proximity, but also social and cultural aspects. Furthermore, states engaged in a 
region have [...] shared political attitudes and institutions, and economic interdependence 
(Mansfield & Solingen, 2010: 146).  
According to Frederik Söderbaum (2011), most scholars who engage in the recent debate on 
regions agree, that none of the definitions is definite. However, what they agree on is that 
regions are not natural creations. In Söderbaum’s study on contemporary regionalism, he 
presents two approaches to defining regions: mainstream and constructivist. Mainstream 
theorists, who are based in the rationalist approach and were dominating in the first wave of 
regionalism, believe that regions are […] particular inter-state or policy-driven frameworks 
(Söderbaum, 2011: 6). In their understanding of regions being pre-given, emphasis is put on 
the importance of regional organizations. Constructivists, on the contrary, perceive regions as 
socially constructed forms, which are highly dependable on how political actors perceive and 
understand the concept of region. Therefore, according to this course of thought, regions do 
not have defined geographical borders and highly depend on how social identities are shaped 
internationally (Söderbaum, 2011). 
Some authors question sharing the same physical spaces as a condition for nations to belong 
to a particular region. Mansfield and Milner (1999) present a view shared by a number of 
authors, regarding the non-geographic criteria for defining regions. Regional groupings can 
include countries lying far away from each other, such as France and the Francophone 
countries of Northwest Africa, for instance (Mansfield & Milner, 1999). In that sense, 
location does not play any role in the organization of regions. Social constructivists, in 
particular, tend to emphasize the irrelevance of geographical proximities and put focus on 
‘communal identity’ being the main driver behind the creation of regions (ibid.). Thereby, 
due to no clear legal rules or norms regulating the membership in a certain region in most 
cases, thinking of regions ought to focus more on processes taking place between the 
involved states, rather than searching for ultimate definitions (Breslin, Higgott & Rosamond, 
2002). 
Taking all of the different definitions of a region into account, we chose to follow the 
definition offered by Mansfield and Solingen (2010), who include both geographical location 
and political and cultural aspects in the understanding of regions. Since this project focuses 
on trade regionalism in the case of ASEAN+3, we perceive region as consisting of actors, 
who belong to the Southeast Asian area. However, we also consider various socio-cultural 
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characteristics of the region, thereby the definition we use provides a broad framework for 
the discussion. 
Regionalism and Regionalization 
Discrepancies and differences in understanding regions have consequently led to a number of 
perspectives on international integration, among nations belonging to particular regions. 
According to Finn Laursen (2003), although there are various integration schemes, they 
mainly focus on creating trade, which is more free and accessible for its participants. The 
objective of such an interstate cooperation is to provide more efficient flows of goods and 
services between the states, which chose to engage in different integrating initiatives (Finn, 
2003). Thereby, most scholars consider regionalism a form of regional cooperation, usually 
in terms of economic cooperation, focused on creating free trade areas (ibid.).  
The majority of authors distinguish two forms of contemporary regional cooperation: 
regionalism and regionalization. They emphasize that these should be seen as two 
complementary, rather than contradictory processes. The main difference between these two 
is the different actors involved in each of them. Regionalism is by many believed to be a 
‘state-led project’ (Söderbaum, 2011; Schulz, Söderbaum & Öjendal, 2001). According to 
Söderbaum (2011) however, such a perspective on regionalism is too limited, as states are not 
the only actors having an impact on the political and economic circumstances in the region. 
Therefore, it is more accurate to define regionalism as the [...] policy and project or the 
cognitive idea of forming regions (Söderbaum, 2011: 14). Regionalization, on the other hand, 
should be understood as a societal process; less dictated by legal agreements and policies, and 
more dependable on social identities and values shared and spread by non-state actors 
(Söderbaum, 2011).  
These two forms of regional cooperation have also been recognized by other authors, like 
Mansfield and Milner (1999), for instance. In their opinion regionalization refers to the 
process of economic flows being concentrated in a specific region. Regionalism, on the other 
hand, is a political process, which [...] involves economic policy cooperation and 
coordination among countries (Mansfield & Milner, 1999: 591). Regionalism focuses 
primarily on trade among the engaged states, therefore its functioning is highly dependent on 
international arrangements and agreements, which regulate policies regarding different 
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economic sectors in the region. Because of this, the study of regionalism focuses mainly on 
official economic policies in form of PTAs (Mansfield & Milner, 1999).  
Since this project focuses on regional cooperation in ASEAN+3, we chose to use the concept 
of regionalism as defined by Mansfield and Milner (1999). Although their definition of 
regionalism shares the general understanding of the process with the view presented by other 
authors, like Fredrik Söderbaum for instance, it highlights formal policies and agreements as 
an important part of regionalism. Moreover, it perceives regionalism as a process of creating 
closer cooperation in terms of economic relations. Therefore, this definition will serve more 
sufficiently in the study of trade policies and regional trade agreements. In our project 
regionalization will refer to the process of creating social identity as a fundament for regional 
cooperation. This will however not be the subject of the research.  
 
Waves of Regionalism 
As seen in the section above, it can be quite challenging to define regionalism or region, what 
has led to a great number of approaches and definitions developing during last couple of 
decades. As regions are not naturally determined or definite and, according to different 
theories, can be either policy-driven or socially constructed, there is no clear and absolute 
definition of the mechanisms behind regionalism (Söderbaum, 2011). The origins of 
regionalism, which we observe today are placed after the Second World War, when 
international associations just began to rise and gave the beginning to the developing study of 
regionalism (Fawcett, 2008). However, first steps towards regional integration were already 
taken in the 19th century, when a liberal international trading system started to shape. At that 
time […] PTAs were networked via most-favored-nation clauses (Mansfield & Solingen, 
2010: 148). Later, during the interwar period, they became discriminatory in economic terms 
and led to a decline in world trade.  
Due to little focus on regional integration and very few regional groupings before 1945, 
literature on regionalism primarily covers the last 60 years, and tends to distinguish between 
different phases of regional cooperation. Different political and economic events caused 
changes in theorizing about regionalism and its implications on the local and global scales. 
These different theoretical frameworks differ in terms of dividing the history of regionalism 
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into phases, sometimes referred to as ‘waves’ (Söderbaum, 2011). The most common 
distinction is one between ‘old’ and ‘new’ regionalism, which has been recognized by a range 
of scholars (Breslin, Higgott & Rosamond, 2002; Mansfield & Solingen, 2010; Söderbaum, 
2011). 
Old Regionalism 
Early debates on coherent regionalism, which fall into the ‘old regionalism’ wave, started in 
the 1950s when the first regional initiatives took place, and the research continued until the 
end of the 1960s. They were centered around Europe as the main actor and ringleader of 
regionalism. The leading theories during this period were federalism, functionalism and neo-
functionalism, which in the case of European integration, being the pioneer of regionalism at 
that time, were seen more as political programs than theories. Although federalism and 
functionalism promoted international cooperation and peace-making, and were significant 
drivers behind the ideology of regionalism, it was neo-functionalism that became most 
influential (Söderbaum, 2011). 
Regionalism in the 1950s was based on the case of European integration and any attempts of 
regionalizing in different parts of the world took from the European experience, by 
reproducing the mechanisms deemed necessary for Europe to regionalize. The European case 
was seen as a model of regionalism and according to neo-functionalists any other forms of 
regionalism were weaker, less efficient, or did not function at all (Söderbaum, 2011).  
Europe remained at the center of studies on regionalism during most of the ‘old wave’ period. 
In the 1960s the neo-functionalist approach to regional cooperation was challenged by 
Harvard professor, Stanley Hofmann who argued that national interests dictate the occurrence 
and prosperity of integrational process. Furthermore, international integration could not 
spread from economics to security, therefore the economic sector was the one which ought to 
be looked upon, when studying regionalism (Hettne & Söderbaum, 2008). European 
institutions, with the European Committee as a leader, which during the 1950s were seen as 
the model of regionalism, faced shift in how the process of integration and their role in it was 
understood. Focus moved from international institutions being drivers for regional 
cooperation towards more realist approaches, with strong emphasis on state-centrism (ibid.). 
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New Regionalism 
New Regionalism (NR) is a wave of theories on the revitalization of regionalism and 
regionalization in the post-Cold War era (Schulz, Söderbaum & Öjendal, 2001). This 
‘reappearance’ of regionalism is considered an important trend within contemporary 
international relations (IR) and is characterized by a deeper understanding of the overlapping 
and fluid structures of social, political, and economic dimensions. ‘Old regionalism’ was 
understood from a particular historical context (ca. 1950s-70s) and […] studying the renewed 
trend towards regionalism sometimes involves the feeling of déjà vu, [but] both the context 
and content of regionalism have changed dramatically (Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998: 1). 
NR is related to the multitude of transformations of the international system evolving in the 
aftermath of the Cold War, such as: 
 The change from the bipolar Cold War structure, towards a multipolar structure. 
 The relative decline of American hegemony. 
 The restructuring of the global political economy into three major blocs: the European 
Union, the North American Free Trade Area, and the Asia-Pacific, which are all based 
on different forms of capitalism. 
 The associated ‘globalization’ of finance, trade, production and technology, which has 
led to a New International Division of Labor (NIDL). 
 The recurrent fears over the stability of the multilateral trading order, hand in hand 
with the growing importance of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade. 
 The changed attitudes towards (neo-liberal) economic development and political 
systems in the developing countries as well as in the post-communist countries 
(Hettne & Inotai, 1994; Hettne, Inotai & Sunkel 1999; Schulz, Söderbaum & Öjendal, 
2001). 
This wide-ranging approach to regionalism is deemed necessary because the dominant 
theories of IR do not take into account the […] multidimensionality, pluralism and 
comprehensiveness of contemporary regionalization processes, nor the way in which these 
are socially constructed (Schulz, Söderbaum & Öjendal, 2001: 2). NR also recognizes that 
emerging contemporary regions and processes of regionalization are very much 
developments in the making and in search of theory. Additionally, at this stage in IR, there is 
Katarzyna Magda Tarasiewicz, Rikke Lykke Andersen, Emil Matthews, Nikolaj Gedionsen  
Bachelor-project, Spring 2015 
International Studies  
Roskilde University 
Page 15 of 73 
a need to conduct reflective research and maintain theoretical open-mindedness, rather than 
pushing the case for strictly causal theory (Schulz, Söderbaum & Öjendal, 2001). 
Therefore, NR can make use of the interdisciplinary and comparative analytical framework 
called ‘new regionalism approach’ (NRA) (Hettne & Inotai 1994; Hettne, Inotai & Sunkel, 
1999). Building on critical international political economy theories, social constructivism, 
and empirical case studies from all parts of the world, NRA seeks to uncover existing power 
structures and imbalances in order to identify alternative avenues for social and structural 
change (Schulz, Söderbaum & Öjendal, 2001). It was the concern with the impact of 
globalization and the different globalizing processes that led some international political 
economy theorists to explore the importance of institutions and policy regimes. This led to 
the increased attention to regionalism and regional processes, which in turn illustrated the 
importance of regional and domestic structures (O’Brien & Williams, 2013). NRA also works 
from the assumptions that […] it seems that we are dealing with different overlapping layers 
of globalisms/globalizations and regionalizms/regionalizations simultaneously (Schulz, 
Söderbaum & Öjendal, 2001: 4). In other words, globalism/globalization and 
regionalism/regionalization are mutually reinforcing and at other times contradictory (Hettne, 
Inotai & Sunkel., 1999). 
Additionally, NRA understands that the ‘contemporary wave of regionalism’ should not be 
understood as an alternative to the nation state, but as a supplemental instrument to enhance 
and/or protect the role and power of the government in an increasingly interdependent world 
(Schulz, Söderbaum and Öjendal, 2001). 
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Analytical Approaches 
In order to get an overview of different understandings of what the important factors are, 
when constituting, explaining, and defining the concept of regionalism, we gathered data 
from the numerous authors and their analytical approaches to the concept of regionalism. We 
have identified three categories, each consisting of two different standpoints. The three 
categories are: Exogenous vs. Endogenous, Rationalist vs. Social Constructivist, and State vs. 
Non-State Actors. The three categories and different standpoints have been identified from 
tendencies found throughout the literature. Additionally, the authors placed in the same 
category might not be placed together for the same reasons. Moreover, several authors take 
into account several of the different standpoints equally, and therefore fit into the authors’ 
category placement might not be for the same reasons, and several authors take into account 
the different standpoints, and therefore fit into both. 
Exogenous vs. Endogenous 
In this category a distinction between factors impacting regionalism is divided into 
exogenous (external), and endogenous (internal) factors. Authors analyzing regionalism from 
an exogenous standpoint claim that the main influences on regionalism stem from external 
factors, understood as factors outside of a given region have an effect on the form and extent 
of regionalism. An endogenous approach asserts that it is internal factors within the region 
that have the largest impact on regionalism. It is to be noted, that most theorists within the 
study of regionalism draw on both exogenous and endogenous factors when analyzing the 
formation of regionalism. 
Theorists such as Michael Schulz, Joakim Öjendal, Björn Hettne and András Inotai 
emphasize that the new wave of regionalism, is an exogenous effect because of the rise of 
global interaction. They also recognizes that changes in this view are historically based, and 
that endogenous influences affect states’ global interactions (see State vs. Non-State Actors 
below). Jaqcues Hersh (2000), Sterian M. Gabriela & Zirra Daniela (n.d.) and Jagdish 
Bhagwati (1992) also identify globalization to be one of the major determinants of 
regionalism. Other exogenous determinants include regionalism as: a response to exclusion 
from other markets (Pal, 2004; Sohn, 2002), a response to multilateralism (Pal, 2004; 
Gabriela & Daniela, n.d.), an effect of economic insecurity and financial crisis (Breslin, 
Higgott & Rosamond, 2002; Bustelo, 2000; Grimes, 2009). 
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Frederik Söderbaum (2011) asserts that outside-in (exogenous) and inside-out (endogenous) 
are two ways of understanding regionalism. Outside-in sees regionalism as in parallel with 
globalization and that both are caused by big global transformations. According to the inside-
out perspective, on the other hand, regionalism is an outcome of actions taken by regional 
actors, in particular regions and in many sectors, like trade, security and so on. 
There are several determinants that can be deduced on the basis of an endogenous approach. 
One of the most common determinants is based around the assumption that states form 
regional ties in order to increase economic benefits (Pal, 2004; Lawrence, 1999; Munakata, 
2006). Another key determinant that can be identified in literature focusing on endogenous 
variables, is the wish to increase regional community (Munakata, 2006; Fouquin, 2008). 
Recently, studies have begun to look into the role of multinational corporations in relation to 
the formation of regionalism. Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2002) is dealing with multinational 
corporations, arguing that their economic interests can push a country towards implementing 
policies of regional integration.  
Within endogenous and exogenous analytical perspectives it is important to note that most 
authors consider both aspects. It is generally accepted, that in order to form a comprehensive 
understanding of the causes of regionalism, both endogenous and exogenous variables have 
to be looked upon. This project aims at explaining the move towards trade regionalism in 
ASEAN+3 and in order to get a more encompassing view on this research question, both 
endogenous and exogenous variables will be included in the analysis.  
In this project, the use of the exogenous approach, or external factors, is understood as the 
global influences on the regionalism of ASEAN+3, as well as the inter-regional influences. 
The endogenous approach, or internal factors is understood as the domestic factors of the 
different member states of ASEAN+3, factors such as; identities, institutions, and interests. 
This will elaborated on later in this chapter.  
Rationalist vs. Social Constructivist 
The rationalist vs. social constructivist distinction is mainly a division between authors who 
are fundamentally based in either a rationalistic approach to knowledge, or a social 
constructivist approach. Most of the authors based in the social constructivist division accuse 
regionalism theorists, from the old regionalism way of thinking, of basing their theories too 
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much in rationalist thinking, without acknowledging the possibility of viewing regionalism 
from different standpoints (Hettne, Inotai & Sunkel 1999).  
According to Christian Fjäder (2005), the rationalist approach mainly focuses on material 
issues, being the major driver behind regionalism. It assumes the existence of certain 
independent truths, and therefore actors engaged in the process of regionalism are rational 
and follow rational calculations. Therefore, regionalism is believed to be an outcome of 
negotiations made by self-interested states which, driven by their rationality, undertake 
actions aimed at producing [...] the best-conceived result, mainly in terms of material security 
and/or wealth (Fjäder, 2005: 89). Furthermore, the rationalist approach is based around the 
analysis of formal institutions. Authors drawing on the rationalists tradition are often 
preoccupied with power distribution and security dilemmas, as drivers of regionalism 
(Baldwin, 1997; Grimes, 2009). Grimes (2009) looks at balancing, cooperation, and contest 
between China, Japan, and the US within East Asian regionalism. He identifies a strong need 
to insulate the domestic systems from US influence and interference. 
Ideational approach, on the other hand, focuses less on material interests, and more on the 
influence of ideas and beliefs. Michael Schulz, Christian Fjäder, Joakim Öjendal, Björn 
Hettne, András Inotai, and Frederik Söderbaum adhere to the social constructivist way of 
thinking. They all agree that features of regionalism and political behavior are dictated by 
socially constructed norms and rules, and that New Regionalism does away with the ‘old-
fashioned’ views on what causes regionalism. Social constructivists emphasize the role of 
politics, culture, and identity as some of the key determinants of regionalism, which are often 
overlooked by rationalists: Hence, regional awareness and regional identity have a central 
role in how regional cooperation is shaped (Fjäder, 2005: 90). Kopstein and Lichbach (2009) 
also draw on the social constructivist tradition, by looking at domestic politics through 
identities, interests, and institutions. New regionalists are mainly social constructivists, but 
can draw on the rationalist tradition, in the sense that they also look at existing power 
structures.  
The authors placed in this category’s both viewpoints claim that most regionalism theorists 
cling to one approach, but all approaches must be taken into consideration, in order to reach a 
full understanding of regionalism. Christian Fjäder (2005), states that there are two 
theoretical perspectives on regionalism, however none of them can explain it alone, so they 
are highly intertwined. Different studies of regionalism usually follow one approach and do 
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not integrate important aspects of the other. According to Fjäder (2005), each of them 
explains different aspects of regionalism so one should not disregard any of them. 
Rationalists focus on material interdependency; actors behave in ways which will guarantee 
them material security. From this perspective, regionalism can happen when states want to 
avoid the consequences of power shifts or due to concern about security, economy, and 
wealth. In social constructivist approach, also called ideational approach, which East Asian 
regionalism studies have greatly relied on, regionalism is an outcome of culture and pursuit 
of regional identity (Fjäder, 2005).  
As mentioned before, this project will draw on the new regionalism approach, which means 
that the primary analytical focus will be social constructivist. In case of ASEAN, the 
perception of regional identity is highly influential in terms of creating cooperative 
initiatives. The creation and further development of ASEAN has been strongly influenced by 
the notion of social identities. It is here assumed that even though structures are identified, 
they will be socially constructed and therefore often subject to change. However, since we 
will not only look upon the influence of regional identities but also national interests of 
particular states, supposedly driven by material benefits, we also consider the rationalist 
approach important to include. Considering that new regionalism approach provides an 
opportunity to combine both, our standpoint will be partly rationalist and partly 
constructivist.  
State vs. Non-State Actors 
This is a distinction between whether regionalism is looked upon from a state-led point of 
view, or if it can be influenced by non-state actors as well. In a state-led viewpoint, different 
authors highlight different aspects of actions, which states can take or have taken. Authors 
who include non-state actors in the analysis, do not dismiss the state’s role in regionalism but 
emphasize that non-state actors play an important role, which cannot be overlooked. 
Sometimes states, compared to influential international institutions and/or corporations, 
essentially have very little to say in their own process of regionalism. Authors in this 
category’s ‘both’ viewpoint believe that it is a complex interaction between the state and non-
state actors that influences regionalism. 
Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, Pablo Bustelo, Naoko Munakata and Byeong Hae Sohn all take a 
state-centric approach to the analysis of regionalism. Pablo Bustelo asserts that regionalism is 
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state-led, for example by highlighting Japan’s initiative to establish an Asian IMF and 
membership in ASEAN. Jacques Hersh (2000) states that it is the government and its leaders, 
that have to sort out the internal problems. Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2002; 2014) is focused on 
state actors as he looks at how states can help themselves and cooperate with each other.  
Michel Fouquin, Michael Schulz, and Joakim Öjendal stress that non-state actors are 
becoming more of an influence on the state’s actions concerning regionalism, than ever 
before. Björn Hettne, Kopstein and Lichbach, András Inotai, and Frederik Söderbaum states 
that the process of regional integration is too complex to only involve state or non-state actors 
as all of them play a role in developing international cooperation. Söderbaum (2011) 
distinguished forms like: formal vs. informal, top-down vs. bottom-up, hard vs. soft, official 
vs. unofficial and state-led vs. market and society-induced regionalization. Kopstein and 
Lichbach’s (2009) theoretical framework includes identity and non-state actors as 
supplements to the traditional state centric approach. 
Breslin, Higgott, and Rosamond (2002) write that the new wave of regionalism recognizes 
“the complex cocktail” of actors having an impact on the outcome of regional processes. 
These are inter-state and global institutions together with non-state actors like multinational 
corporations. Depending on the place, where regionalism takes place, different actors are of a 
bigger or smaller importance. Mansfield and Solingen (2010) say that both state and non-state 
actors play a role in the process of regionalism in its various forms, however state actors 
seem to remain the key driver.  
In this project, the state’s role in regionalism is considered the main analytical focus when 
regarding the ASEAN+3 member states’ initiatives to the trade regionalism. This does 
however not mean that non-state actors will not be included. We consider non-state actors are 
considered to be the domestic ethnic, religious, and political factors in the individual states, 
and how they influence the trade regionalism of ASEAN+3. 
Interests Identities and Institutions 
It is widely agreed among theorists, based in both old and new regionalism, that the state 
plays a crucial role in the extent to which countries are integrated. However, this does not 
mean that the states are the only variable to be considered when examining regional 
economic integration. The importance of domestic factors has been stressed by various 
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authors within the new regionalism approach. This project is going to build on this tradition 
to analyze trade regionalism in ASEAN+3,  
Operationalization 
In order to operationalize this approach, we are going to draw on the theoretical framework of 
Kopstein and Lichbach (2009), which is dealing with domestic politics. Kopstein and 
Lichbach’s theoretical framework forms a comprehensive view on domestic politics, moving 
beyond the traditional state-centric perspective, by looking at interests, identities, and 
institutions (ibid.). It allows for a more comprehensive insight into the mechanisms of state 
politics. Kopstein and Lichbach do not focus specifically on regionalism in their work. 
Nonetheless, their theoretical framework can be useful for such an analysis, by providing a 
useful framework to understand the domestic politics of the states involved. Due to the fact 
that Kopstein and Lichbach’s theory is targeted at explaining the politics of only one state, we 
will adjust it so that it is useful in a regional setting.  
According to Jeffrey Kopstein and Mark Lichbach (2009), domestic politics can be 
understood by examining the key concepts: Identities, Interests, and Institutions. Since we, 
within the confines of this project, aim at explaining regional integration between thirteen 
states, it will not be possible to make a comprehensive analysis of each state’s identities, 
interests, and institutions. In order to surpass this issue, we will analyze how dominant 
identities, interests, and institutions within the ASEAN+3 member states, have impacted the 
formation of ASEAN+3.   
Since we are looking at trade regionalism in ASEAN+3 but do not go into depth with each 
member state, it is important to specify how we use specific states in our analysis. Specific 
states will be mentioned if they have played a significant role in the promotion or deterrence 
of a certain shared interest, identity, or institution. That means that we will primarily look at 
domestic interests, identities, and institutions that are shared among member states of 
ASEAN and not specify particular interests, identities, and institutions pertaining to every 
individual state. 
Next we will explain how the three key concepts drawn from the theoretical framework of 
Kopstein and Lichbach will be used in this project. 
Interests 
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Interests pertains to domestic politics in the sense that [...] politics is partly about the pursuit 
of interests (Kopstein & Lichbach, 2009: 22). More precisely, interests are connected to 
domestic politics in the sense that people will try to influence domestic politics so that it will 
complement their specific interests (Kopstein & Lichbach, 2009). This has certain 
implication for the assumptions about society and human nature. First of all, it is assumed 
that people are capable of having interests and that these can vary from person to person. 
Second, these interests are constrained by changing societal conditions. Thirdly, people are 
profit maximizers who use cost-benefit analysis to choose the best available choice of action 
(ibid.). Based on these assumptions, there are certain things that have to be taken into 
consideration when choosing the focus of analysis within interests. 
Since interests can vary, it is necessary for the purpose of this project to choose a level of 
analysis, since it is impossible to analyze all the interests within a given country. By looking 
at the biggest and most influential domestic interests, this analysis will be able to come to 
grasp with the larger mechanisms in the relationship between domestic interests and 
regionalism. This means that we will obtain an understanding of the larger picture at the 
expense of the finer nuances of the role of interests. Since we, in this project, aim at 
identifying drivers for regionalism between many different states, an understanding of the 
larger picture is acceptable. 
Identities 
As was stated earlier, different people have different interests. One might ask why this is so. 
According to Kopstein and Lichbach (2009) interests differ because people have different 
identities. Identity can be defined as [...] a set of beliefs and values that we often refer to as 
culture (Kopstein & Lichbach, 2009: 24). This definition is very broad and does not serve to 
be specific enough for an analytical framework. 
Since identity can be narrowed down to include a wide range of parameters, it can be difficult 
to decide upon a manageable and yet meaningful operational definition. When dealing with 
regionalism, a crucial domestic aspect is that of regional identity. If a large part of a country 
places a strong emphasis on state’s bound ethnicity, they might oppose policies moving 
towards regionalism as it could potentially threaten their identity. If a large part of the 
country, on the other hand, identifies themselves in terms of regional affiliation, they are 
more likely to support a political move towards regional integration. Since this project deals 
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with the big picture, we will narrow the analytical focus down to determine if, and to what 
extent, one can talk of a regional identity among the members of ASEAN+3. 
Institutions 
Institutions play an important role because it is an arena in which politics takes place. What is 
meant by institutions is [...] the authoritative rules and organizations that structure political 
life (Kopstein & Lichbach, 2009: 26). This definition, compared to the definition of interests 
and identities is more specific but for the sake of proposing an operational definition, we will 
look further into the connotations of institutions. 
When looking at institutions from the above definition, the state forms a key analytical point. 
The analysis of this project will be focused around the role of the state as an institution. Here 
we will look at institutional strength/weakness, depending on whether the state is able to 
implement and uphold the law. Furthermore, the form of government will be taken into 
account. Here a very broad distinction between democracy and autocracy is implemented to 
facilitate the discussion, as to the benefits and downsides of both in relation to regionalism.    
Delimitations 
Although we use Kopstein and Lichbach’s theoretical framework to structure our analysis, it 
has been necessary to adjust the theory to our chosen case. This means that the theory in its 
original form will not be used. However, this is not a problem because Kopstein and 
Lichbach have identified three key concepts, which can easily be applied to interstate 
relations instead of domestic politics. Since Kopstein and Lichbach’s key concepts (identities, 
interests and institutions) are used to obtain a broad understanding of the formation of 
ASEAN+3, further analysis could be done to obtain a more detailed understanding of the 
individual member states of ASEAN and their partners, to supplement the broader analysis of 
this project.  
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Methods 
Case Study 
Our project investigates the causal links of trade regionalism within ASEAN+3. The case 
consists of certain characteristics, which have led us to conclude that it is a typical one. John 
Gerring specifies an important characteristic of typical cases, saying that [...] the typical case 
exemplifies what is to be considered a typical set of values, given some general 
understanding of a phenomenon (2007: 91). Building on this understanding of a typical case, 
we argue that trade regionalism is not a new phenomenon, but that a number of examples 
exist, where the typical set of values is the same. For instance, we need only look at the 
regionalism of trade in Europe or South America to find these similar values. Similar 
principles, which also are present in our own case, such as the formation of FTAs in order to 
promote trade regionalism. 
When we consider a typical case, it is not a new phenomenon, it is an event or situation 
which has occurred before (Gerring, 2007). Of course, there exist various cultures and 
political views within any state and they will cause variations. However, we identify the 
overall values of these cases to be the same. For example, as mentioned above, the 
implementation of FTAs, but also the cooperation between states, the creation of formal 
institutions with regard to the establishment of trade regionalism, and the benefits that all 
countries gain, are important core values that exist in all cases.  
Process Tracing 
The primary method used in the analysis of this project is process tracing - a methodological 
approach which we feel has particular relevance to our project. It allows us to delve deeper 
into the subject and paint a more well-rounded pictures of the determinants for trade 
regionalism within ASEAN; more so, than other methods such as descriptive analysis.  
When considering the qualitative angle to our project, process tracing became a natural 
choice as it is particularly well suited for the task, it has been described by some as a [...] 
fundamental tool of qualitative analysis (Collier, 2011: 823). According to David Collier, 
process tracing is [...] the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and 
analysed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator (2011: 824). 
Building on this, process tracing involves the construction of hypotheses related to the topic 
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of investigation. From this, we will systematically examine and analyze our data in light of 
our hypotheses to diagnose their strength. Ergo, by applying process tracing to our project, 
we will be able to examine the details surrounding regionalism in ASEAN+3. We will 
identify the causal mechanisms or determining factors of regionalism in the region, while at 
the same time providing justification and validation for these findings. 
According to Collier (2011), process tracing has become a fundamental methodological tool 
due to its diverse and decisive contributions to investigators research objectives. For example, 
process tracing can help us identify political and social phenomena, while at the same time 
allowing us to systematically describe them. It can help us examine other explanatory 
hypotheses, discover new ones, and perhaps most importantly, it can allow us to gain an 
insight into the causal mechanisms of trade regionalism in ASEAN+3 (Collier, 2011). While 
methods such as statistical analysis investigate the causal effects of a case, process tracing 
investigates the ‘causal mechanisms’ (Beach & Pedersen, n.d.). Causal mechanisms are a 
much more elaborate and inclusive form of analysis. Tulia G. Fallet defines causal 
mechanisms as [...] ultimately unobservable physical, social, or psychological processes 
through which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or 
conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities (2006: 2). In this sense, 
finding the causal mechanisms within ASEAN+3 regionalism, will naturally lead us to 
discovering the determining factors, and how they and their influence actually developed. 
As we clarified earlier, process tracing is based upon the testing of hypotheses. Therefore, we 
will begin by developing working hypotheses related to our working questions. These 
working hypotheses will be built on the grounds of our theory, focusing on identities, 
interests, and institutions in regard to trade regionalism in ASEAN+3. Using our working 
hypotheses, we will then apply process tracing, more specifically what is commonly termed 
the ‘4 folded typology’ (Heersink, 2014). This form of process tracing has four tests 
associated with it: the straw-in-the-wind, hoop, smoking-gun and doubly decisive test. These 
provide us with a useful framework for evaluating the strength of evidence in favor, yet also 
against, a particular hypothesis (ibid.). The ‘4 folded typology’ has the advantage of, while 
allowing us to discover the strength of our hypotheses, it simultaneously allows us to 
eliminate or weaken other rival hypotheses through what is commonly referred to as the 
‘Sherlock Holmes’ rule (Collier, 2011; Heersink, 2014). This builds upon the idea that [...] 
once the impossible has been eliminated, what remains, however improbable, must be the 
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truth (Heersink, 2014: 6). Therefore, using process tracing, this project will be able to show, 
not only which factors are determinant in ASEAN+3 trade regionalism, but also which are 
more important than others, through the strength of each individual hypothesis. When one 
applies process tracing, they can either follow a strict, very structured form of testing, or they 
can follow a more dynamic, less step-by-step form of analysis (Collier, 2011). For our own 
project we will be using a more dynamic format. We will take the concepts behind the 
various tests and apply them. In this sense, we will still be able to identify how strong or 
weak or hypotheses are, however we will not have to place them in a particular category of 
strength. 
When we analyze trade regionalism within ASEAN+3, the primary area of investigation will 
be within identities, interests, and institutions. In addition to this however, we will take into 
consideration the external actors whose presence in ASEAN+3 has also attributed to their 
increased want for regionalism. These external actors will be examined regarding their 
individual influence on the region, but also in terms of how their relationships with different 
states within ASEAN have an effect on the unfolding events. For example, the relationship 
between the US and China, and how this has influenced the decision of both states with 
regards to ASEAN, but also how their relationship has influenced other states’ decisions, 
with regards to regionalism. 
Research framework 
As made clear in our theory section, this project will adhere to the social constructivist school 
of thought. More specifically, this means that it is assumed that regionalism is a social 
construct and therefore subject to change. How regionalism in different areas come to be and 
evolve, will depend on the societal context of that area. This project aims at explaining why 
trade regionalism within ASEAN+3 looks the way it does. In order to understand this, the 
logic of social constructivism dictates that we should examine the societal context, in which 
ASEAN+3 is situated. This means, that a strict explanatory theoretical framework, dealing 
with regionalism at a general level will serve to be inspirational at best. This approach is 
reflected in new regionalism, where it is argued that the field of regionalism is in need of 
theory and hence, the analytical approaches to regionalism should aim at being explorative. 
This leads us to our choice of theory. 
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Since the field of East and Southeast Asian regionalism is relatively new and exploratory in 
nature, it has been difficult to find a single explanatory theory to help structure our analysis. 
However, given the aim of new regionalism, a single explanatory theory on regionalism 
would only work to limit our analytical insight. Because of this, the analytical framework of 
this project will be centered on Kopstein and Lichbach’s theoretical framework. This 
theoretical framework aims at explaining how domestic policies come to be. Since this 
project does not deal with a single country but 13, an adaption of the theory has been 
necessary. By using Kopstein and Lichbach’s key concepts of identities, interests, and 
institutions this project can add to the discussion on the causes of East and Southeast Asian 
trade regionalism from a more domestic point of view. 
To operationalize the causal relation between the concepts of identities, interests, and 
institutions and trade regionalism in ASEAN+3, this project will use process tracing. 
Traditionally, process tracing was a method often used in rationalist approaches to determine 
causal structures in society. Process tracing does however, also hold relevance from a social 
constructivist point of view in the sense social constructivists also deal with causal 
mechanisms, just in a more temporal manner. By using process tracing, we will be able to 
determine the causal relations between the formation of ASEAN+3 and the societal context 
of its members, herein defined as identities, interests, and institutions.    
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Analysis 
In this section we will analyze our three working questions. Firstly, we will look at identities 
and the extent to which one can talk about a regional identity. Secondly, an analysis of 
national interests among the members of ASEAN+3 will be provided. Lastly, we will 
examine the role of institutions within regional integration of trade. 
WQ 1: Looking at domestic identities, to what extent can one talk of an 
ASEAN+3 identity? 
ASEAN has from its conception stated that the organization was to accelerate the economic 
growth, social progress and cultural development of its member states (ASDEC, 1967). The 
focus, to a great extent of the time, seems to have been on the economic growth and less on 
the social and cultural aspects. According to Amitav Acharya, it is not surprising that critics 
dismiss the idea of […] a regional identity […] as “cheap talk” (2008: 112), yet, he also 
claims that there seem to be evidence of an ASEAN identity emerging. 
According to Narine, scholars of ASEAN post two dominant viewpoints concerning a shared 
regional identity: 
 ASEAN forms the basis of regional community of Southeast Asia, and […] embodies 
the fundamental norms, values, and practices that have, over time, socialized the 
ASEAN states into adopting a shared regional identity (2001: 1). 
 ASEAN is purely an instrument for its members and is designed to pursue their self-
interests, and therefore any sense of identity is imaginary, at best (2001). 
These perspectives are very broad and wide-ranging but helpful to keep in mind. In order to 
highlight the different angles concerning identity in the ASEAN+3 member states, the two 
viewpoints will be expanded into several hypotheses. These hypotheses have been surmised 
from tendencies found in the different authors’ and researchers’ publications, as well as 
examples from specific states’ actions over time, all which will be presented continuously: 
1. An ASEAN identity is a weak identity at best, as the ASEAN+3 member states are 
only using ASEAN+3 to actively pursue their individual self-interests. 
2. It is difficult to recognize a shared regional identity in the ASEAN+3 member states, 
especially, when considering the ASEAN+3 member states’ different stages of state-
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building and their respective domestic issues with ethnic, religious, and/or political 
factors. 
3. There is an ASEAN+3 member state identity, and it is getting stronger as more and 
more regionalism is happening within ASEAN+3. 
 
An ASEAN identity is a weak identity at best, as the ASEAN+3 member states are only 
using ASEAN+3 to actively pursue their individual self-interests. 
The colonial legacy is strong in Southeast Asia. Most states in the region did not gain 
independence until after the end of the Second World War. This has had a profound impact 
on the regional states’ view on national identity. The colonial legacy created a need for a 
strong national identity for the individual countries, but also a need for national autonomy 
and sovereignty (Yoshimatsu, 2002). 
Traditionally, ASEAN has adopted a posture of non-interference in the domestic politics of 
its member states (Dittmer, 2010: 328), and it was in fact this attitude that has been formed 
by the ASEAN member states’ (AMSs’) needs for domestic sovereignty, and why 
membership in ASEAN was attractive to most, if not all, of its members. For example, it was 
why Burma/Myanmar joined ASEAN in 1997. In addition […] it sought regional alliances 
and legitimacy to counter the isolation imposed by the West (Dittmer, 2010: 328). 
As mentioned, it could be said that ASEAN’s norms and practices are a reflection of the 
collected practices of the ASEAN+3 member states, and are the evidence of an actual 
socialization that has taken place over time. These norms put emphasis on the independence 
and sovereignty of its member states and, ironically, can be said to actually diminish the idea 
of a strong regional community. Considering that the position of non-interference is in the 
high-seat of ASEAN+3 member states’ norm, the ASEAN+3 regional identity does not 
prevent the ASEAN+3 member states from putting their national interests ahead of any 
regional interests. It even encourages them to do so (Narine, 2001). 
This argument is supported when considering Japan’s and China’s long history of almost-
hostile animosity. According to Naoko Munakata (2006), before 1998 Asian regionalism 
seemed unlikely, especially because of Japan’s wartime legacy. Particularly, in China there is 
a strong anti-Japanese sentiment, which pervades through all layers of the Chinese society 
(e.g. Japanese as villains in school books and comics). Equally, Japan experienced a rise in 
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anti-Chinese attitude, which was still high to begin with. Furthermore, Japan has been 
accused of twisting its own view on history in its school teachings, which has caused much 
resentment in ASEAN+3 member states (Munakata, 2006). The consequences of this 
animosity have influenced how these two superpowers have interacted with ASEAN and its 
member states. This was because both China and Japan had a fear of being left out of regional 
dealings, and because, at the very least, one of them would manage to sabotage it for the 
other (ibid.). 
This points to, that ASEAN+3 members are occupied with their individual self-interests, and 
therefore a regional identity would seem to be a rather weak identity, which lends credence 
this hypothesis. Yet, if one considers the fact that ASEAN was established on the same point 
of departure, being the shared interest for national sovereignty in the post-war era, and the 
shared approach of non-interference, it seems that we are able to identify at least a form of 
shared regional norms. If the shared idea is that all member states are entitled/encouraged to 
put their own interests first, then the regional cooperation is centered on the individual pursuit 
of self-interest. This makes the idea of the ASEAN+3 regional identity somewhat of a 
paradox. However, it can still be construed as a type of shared regional identity. Nevertheless, 
the identity seems weak, and its foundation is on a shared, and encouraged, pursuit of self-
interest. Therefore, the hypothesis can be said to be confirmed. 
It is difficult to recognize a shared regional identity in the ASEAN+3, especially, when 
considering the ASEAN+3 different stages of state-building and their respective 
domestic issues with ethnic, religious, and/or political factors. 
The level of commitment to the ASEAN identity varies from member state to member state, 
and should be understood in the light of the fact that the ASEAN+3 are all in different stages 
of state-building, and several of the states are themselves trying to create national identities 
from many different domestic factions (Narine, 2001). According to Eric Vincent C. Batalla: 
East Asian integration cannot ignore the politics of identity. Basic tensions exist in the region 
with respect to identities including those between one nation and another, between region and 
nation, and even ethnic group and nation (2010: 72). 
A clear example of tensions regarding political identities, was the sale of Shin 
Telecommunications, in Thailand in 2006, to Temasek Holdings. Shin Telecommunications 
was Thailand’s largest mobile phone operator, and owned by the, at the time, Thai Prime 
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minister, Thakshin Shinawatra. Temasek Holdings was the Singaporean government’s 
investment arm. The sale caused huge controversy for the Thai population (Batalla, 2010). 
The deal was criticized for not only lining the Prime minister’s own pockets, but also for 
giving economic, security, and communication sovereignty to foreigners (THAI-SAL, 2006). 
Even though the so-called ‘foreigners’ was a fellow ASEAN member state, [...] the takeover 
deal was criticized, a coup followed as domestic groups reasserted their distinctive identities 
(Preston, 2007: 79). In this case, the Thai population felt that their own ethnic and political 
identity was in danger, so much so that a military felt the need to overthrow the government. 
In addition, the ASEAN+3 need for a firm grip on their own national sovereignty stems from 
an uncertainty about the individual states’ belief in their own stability (Suryadinata, 2005). 
For example, according to Narine (2001), Indonesia, Cambodia, and the Philippines all 
experience political instability, with political and separatist violence as a consequence. While 
Laos and Vietnam, both being communist states, feel uncertain about their own legitimacy 
among their own population. Burma/Myanmar’s history of violence and lack of international 
recognition puts it in an unstable position internationally. Malaysia and Thailand, although 
relatively politically stable, have both experienced a surge of ethnic tensions. Brunei is an 
Islamic monarchy, which sets it a little apart from its fellow AMSs. Singapore’s single-party 
government has a strong grip on its governing which, according to some of its citizens, is too 
strong. Yet, Singapore feels trapped in hostile environment that is its neighbors’ domestic 
issues (Narine, 2001). 
According to Michael Ernest Jones, [...] ASEAN nations, according to ministerial plans, are 
quite interested in developing social capital in its citizens, but have few projects yet that 
supports this interest (2004: 9). The ASEAN+3 often do not share economic and/or political 
philosophies, nor do they define their security interests similarly. This, therefore, results in a 
lack of strong shared institutions, which, in extension, results in a lack of shared regional 
identity. 
In addition, many of the AMSs suffer from social exclusion, underdevelopment, and poverty. 
Together with a high degree of multi-ethnic and multicultural factors, the level of inequality 
is very high. Particularly, in the rural population of the ASEAN+3 member states, for 
example, in Vietnam’s ethnic minority communities, illiteracy ranges from 72-88% (Jones, 
2004). Furthermore, the differences in religion in the AMSs vary enormously from state to 
state. Even though, 42% of AMSs are Muslim, with only 18% Buddhist and 17% Christian 
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(AS-REL, 2015), the variation of percentage from state to state is huge. For example, in 
Singapore, Laos, and Cambodia between 80-90% of the population is Buddhist, while in 
Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia between 65-87% are Muslim, while the Philippines are 95% 
Christian (ibid.). Malaysia and Brunei, especially, identify their national identity with their 
religion, considering they are both officially Muslim states. 
The ASEAN+3 member states’ identity factors are hugely diverse, both in regards to each 
state domestic factors but also between the individual members of ASEAN+3. Especially, if 
one takes into account the previous hypothesis’ presentation of China’s and Japan’s 
relationship. To make an ASEAN+3 identity, the member states would have to enhance 
people’s bonds that were once national, to be regional (Jones, 2004). A feat not easily done, 
when ethnic, religious, and political factors are as diverse and significant in each individual 
ASEAN+3 state. So, the hypothesis seems to be significantly confirmed. 
There is an ASEAN+3 identity, and it is getting stronger as more and more regionalism 
is happening within ASEAN+3. 
A call for a clearer regional identity came when the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) was set 
up in 1998, at the behest of the then President of South Korea, Kim Dae Jung, with the task to 
find a way towards more regional cooperation, as part of an ASEAN+3 undertaking. In 2001 
EAVG released a report that, among other things, championed a […] fostering [of] the 
identity of an East Asian community (EAVG-REP, 2001: 2) and a […] promotion of regional 
identity and consciousness (EAVG-REP, 2001: 4). 
Of course, a critic might claim that that was another example of “cheap talk”, but the fact that 
none of the pre-1995 ASEAN+3 members has engaged in prolonged military conflict, should 
be a small testament to their level of commitment to the basic ideals of the ASEAN Charter 
(Narine, 2001). 
Additionally, a fundamental component of South- and Southeast Asian diplomacy is the 
‘ASEAN way’. According to Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl (1982), the ASEAN way is based on 
the Malay cultural practice of ‘musjawarah’ and ‘mufukat’, introduced to the Southeast Asian 
diplomacy by Sukarno, the first Indonesian president, after Indonesia gained independency 
from the Netherlands in 1945. Musjawarah and mufukat embody an approach to decision-
making that emphasizes consensus and consultation (Jorgenson-Dahl, 1982). Musjawarah 
means that a leader should use gentle suggestions to guide, while always consult all 
Katarzyna Magda Tarasiewicz, Rikke Lykke Andersen, Emil Matthews, Nikolaj Gedionsen  
Bachelor-project, Spring 2015 
International Studies  
Roskilde University 
Page 33 of 73 
participants and take their views and feelings into consideration before reaching a conclusion 
(ibid.). Mufukat means consensus and is the goal toward which musjawarah is directed. 
Furthermore, musjawarah relies on the willingness of participants to be aware of the larger 
interests at stake, and any negotiations take place […] not between opponents but as between 
friends and brothers (Jorgenson-Dahl, 1982: 166). 
However, when viewing the promotion of the ASEAN+3 identity, suggestions that it is not all 
voices that is being heard emerge, and it seems that the professed ‘people-oriented’ 
organization, as is stated in the ASEAN Charter (AS-CHAR, 2008), is under critique. 
According to Ahmad Rizky M. Umar, a researcher at ASEAN Studies Centre in Universitas 
Gadjah Mada in Indonesia, it seems that there is a definitive lack of features in the ASEAN 
bureaucracy that allow for ‘people’s’ interest groups to be heard. Umar points out, that […] 
[w]ithout creating spaces for any interest group to speak, we will only have an ‘elite-driven’ 
ASEAN which is, of course, not ‘people-oriented’ at all (2015, n.d.). 
According to Tobias Ingo Nischalke (2000), it is mostly the foreign policy elites, such as the 
Foreign Affairs ministers, and academic institutions that end up sharing a common identity 
with the different ASEAN+3 counterparts. Nischalke (ibid.) also states, that it seems that 
most of the decisions where an AMS disregarded an ASEAN initiative, was when the AMS’s 
foreign minister was not involved. It seems that ASEAN member’s foreign ministries are the 
repositories of the ASEAN way (Nischalke, 2000). Narine agrees that the personal 
relationship between the leaders of the AMSs has been important in creating a shared 
ASEAN identity: […] much of [ASEAN’s] business is carried out on the golf courses and in 
the corridors between meetings, is directly related to the personal relationship between 
regional leaders (2001: 202). It seems that the forerunners of a shared regional identity are 
indeed the elites of the AMSs. That begs the question: What happens when leadership in a 
given state changes? 
Many of the ASEAN+3 member states have become more and more democratic, which 
usually means a higher rate of substitution in political positions, and therefore it could be 
surmised that many of the original personal relationships between ASEAN+3 leaders might 
be lost. Yet, it could also be said, that the states with more authoritarian governments would 
have less substitutions, and therefore, paradoxically, they would be able to keep their 
personal relationships with their ASEAN+3 counterparts. 
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Another paradoxical viewpoint can be found: the forum that ASEAN+3 has created for its 
member states – the very forum they supposedly use for furthering their self-interest – 
enables the ASEAN+3 member states to meet on a regular basis, and this regular contact have 
lessened the tensions between them. This is further substantiated by Schulz, Söderbaum, and 
Öjendal when they assert that […] ASEAN member countries have nevertheless laid a solid 
foundation from which they can continue to build a more substantial community (2001: 18).  
It can therefore be said, that even though some of the personal relationships may have been 
lost, a forum for discussion of common goals have been established with the ASEAN+3. This 
establishment of a common organization, in itself, is also a strong indication that […] [t]he 
commitment of the ASEAN states to the organization is rooted in a belief that ASEAN can 
affect regional events by influencing the normative environment (Narine, 2001: 4). 
In regards to the stated hypothesis, it is partly confirmed simultaneously having the 
possibility to be partly weakened. There is an ASEAN identity, but it is mostly confined to 
the political and academic elite of the ASEAN+3 member states. On the other hand, there is a 
belief that ASEAN+3 can affect norms, and there has been stated an official and definite goal 
of fostering a regional identity, and therefore there is the potential for a stronger regional 
identity. So, it comes down to what goals will be promoted by ASEAN+3 in the future. 
Part Conclusion 
When considering the different analyses of the different hypotheses, it becomes apparent that 
the issue of a regional ASEAN+3 identity is unclear. The different ASEAN+3 states share 
foundational features, such as their shared colonial past, and their mutual support of non-
interference, which itself stems from a common adoption of ‘the ASEAN way’. Yet, the 
ASEAN+3 member states’ diverse domestic factors make it hard for some of them to 
stimulate a national identity, which in turn makes it harder to support a regional identity. 
Especially, considering some of the member states’ animosity against other member states. It 
becomes even harder when it is mostly a political and academic elite, which really could be 
said to share and support a regional identity. Although, it is the “same” elite that actually 
helped form the regionalism in the first place, and therefore they have the power and drive to 
strengthen a regional identity if they chose to do so. 
In conclusion, in looking at domestic identities, the extent to which one could speak of an 
ASEAN+3 identity, is rather varied and paradoxical. There is an ASEAN+3 identity to the 
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extent that the founders, scholars, and leaders that form an elite of ASEAN+3 have come to 
share an identity, but the identity is not ‘people-oriented’ to the same extent. However, it is 
the ASEAN+3 elite that has the power to strengthen the ASEAN+3 identity among people, 
but many different individual domestic issues may lie in the way of prioritizing such regional 
issues. Particularly, when there is a shared idea of serving one’s national interests first. 
WQ 2: How do national interests determine trade regionalism in 
ASEAN+3? 
ASEAN has been the leader of Asian regionalism since the 1970s. Why states chose to enter 
the association has to a large extent been dictated by their interests in benefiting from 
membership in the organization, focused on providing opportunities for economic and 
political changes. According to Bilson Kurus, the [...] particular position that a member state 
takes on any given issue is first and foremost influenced by its own interests and motivations 
(1995: 406). Throughout the years, member states have not only been resistant to 
compromising their own interests with the regional interests. They also used national ideas 
and motivations as a means of influencing actions taken by ASEAN, as the consensus 
approach taken by the organization was an opportunity for them to determine the course of 
changes (Kurus, 1995). It proves that ASEAN has to a large extent become prone to influence 
of its member states’ domestic politics as ASEAN also aims at applying their national 
motives to general regional needs: [...] the ASEAN diplomacy has served both the national 
interest and regionalism (Teik, 1990: 115). 
This being said, this section will focus on analyzing national interests of AMSs in trade 
regionalism in form of FTAs and PTAs. It will also look upon the interests of China and 
Japan, as two influential actors involved in cooperation with ASEAN. First, we will look 
upon the motivations for joining ASEAN in relation to issues regarding trade. By doing this, 
we will be able to recognize the main ‘interests’ determinants of ASEAN+3 trade 
regionalism. 
There has been a significant increase in the number of trade agreements proposed and 
implemented in the Asian region since the early 1990s. The number of PTAs in the Asia-
Pacific region only, has increased from seven in 1997 to 42 in 2006 (Webber, 2010). This 
poses a question of the relationship between the national interests and actions taken by the 
AMSs and their cooperation partners. They might choose to enter trade agreements for 
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various reasons. Some perceive FTAs as a means of promoting market liberalization while 
for other, usually smaller states, involvement in regional cooperation initiatives is an 
opportunity to improve market competitiveness in terms of production (Lawrence, 2008).  
In the context of ASEAN, nationalism of the member states undoubtedly plays the leading 
role in joining any intraregional agreements: Their willingness to co-operate in the economic 
arena is conditioned by a powerful desire to foster and protect their individual economic 
development and growth (Kurus, 1995: 418). Therefore, considering that different states have 
been exceptionally active, both in offering proposals of cooperation and entering trade 
agreements, focus should be put on how this corresponds to their national interests. By 
looking at these, one can pose various hypotheses about determinants for trade regionalism in 
ASEAN+3. 
Considering the actions taken by AMSs throughout the years, one can pose the following 
hypotheses concerning their national interests: 
1. ASEAN was created on the basis of nations’ interest to form a united front. 
2. ASEAN was created in order to prevent external interference in domestic affairs. 
3. Asian states chose to participate in regional trade initiatives in order to fight the 
instabilities in form of hegemonic powers. 
4. Participating in regional trade agreements in the Asian region is motivated by interests 
in economic benefits. 
5. ASEAN member states consider regional trade agreements as promoting common 
security. 
Furthermore, considering that China and Japan are the major political and economic actors in 
the Asian region, and have played a significant role in ASEAN+3 trade regionalism, we will 
also look upon their national interests behind entering trade agreements. The hypothesis we 
pose in regards to China and Japan is: 
6. China and Japan have perceived joining regional trading agreements as an opportunity 
to strengthen their positions and influence both inside and outside the Asian region.  
ASEAN was created on the basis of nation’s interest to form a united front. 
The formation of ASEAN was initially motivated by security and defense issues. Later, the 
focus shifted more towards ‘common concerns’ (Munakata, 2006). This can be seen in 
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Malaysia’s call for an East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) in 1990. The EAEG was 
supposed to be comprised by the then six members of ASEAN along with China, Japan, and 
South Korea. Its purpose was to create a forum geared to tackle the consolidation of Europe 
and the possibility of a North American Free Trade Agreement (Asami, 2005). Malaysia’s 
proposition of an EAEG was not well received, particularly by the US. The proposition 
received strong opposition from the Bush administration, and Japan and South Korea said no, 
partly due to pressure from the US. Indonesia opposed the formation of EAEG, because it 
wanted to avoid global trading blocs and saw an Asian-only trading bloc as a move towards 
this (Higgott & Stubbs, 1995).   
The rough receival of the EAEG meant that Malaysia had to recognize that its call for an 
Asian-only trade agreement was not enough to get states to commit, so instead Malaysia 
emphasized the need for a strong regional voice (ibid.). EAEG changed its name to an East 
Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) and gained momentum because several states within 
ASEAN and especially Malaysia, felt that their interests were overlooked in international 
negotiations such as in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (ibid.). The 
wish for a stronger regional voice was further strengthened by the 1997 East Asian financial 
crisis. A decline in exports led to a loss of investor’s confidence which was coupled with 
currency devaluations. This placed a heavy strain on many East Asian economies, the 
ASEAN states included, and led many countries to apply for loans through the IMF, which in 
return for loans demanded the implementation of tight budget and monetary policies (Noble 
& Ravenhill, 2000). A general discontent among the AMSs with the way the IMF had 
handled the situation, resulted in the crisis, ending up drawing the Asian economies closer 
together in order to create an effective voice, to have a say in the governance of the 
international monetary system (ibid.). 
The EAEC was, as previously mentioned, formed partly as a response to the prospect of the 
EU and NAFTA. If the members of ASEAN wished to form a united front against these new 
regions, the question can be asked why ASEAN chose to include East Asian states in the 
EAEC and not just form an economic caucus based on the AMSs. It can be argued that 
because ASEAN was not a free trade area at the time, it did not have the ability to counteract 
the emerging EU and NAFTA (Higgott & Stubbs, 1995). Through the formation of EAEC, 
ASEAN would expand to become a wider East Asian organization with increased capacity to 
compete with other trade associations such as EU and NAFTA (ibid.). The use of increasing 
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the scope of ASEAN as a way to give weight to its voice, can also be seen in the inclusion of 
the last four members of ASEAN, namely Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia 
(Severino, 2011).  
It can be argued that a wish to create a united front has been a significant determinant for 
trade regionalism within ASEAN+3. Though economic benefits play an important role within 
trade regionalism, it was the call for a regional voice that became decisive for the formation 
of the EAEC. The wish for a united front was further strengthened by the East Asian financial 
crisis, due to the way the IMF handled the situation. Furthermore, the inclusion of the last 
four members of ASEAN can be seen as a way to lend weight to the regional voice, which is 
a strong tool when ASEAN+3 enters into international discussions.  
ASEAN was created in order to prevent external interference in domestic affairs. 
Since there is only one member state of ASEAN, which has not been under colonial rule 
(Thailand), it is fair to say that the national interests behind the formation and development of 
ASEAN are heavily influenced by a colonial legacy. One place where the AMSs wish for 
national autonomy and sovereignty can be seen is in the non-intrusive measures, 
implemented in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). This treaty 
included, among other things, the principles of: 
Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national 
identity of all nations; The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external 
interference, subversion or coercion [and] Non-interference in the internal affairs of one 
another […] (ASEAN a, 2014) 
ASEAN members’ strong sense of sovereignty can also be seen in the ASEAN secretariat. It 
has been argued that the regional institutions in ASEAN should be strengthened in order for 
ASEAN to reach a level of deeper integration. An example of such a weak institution is the 
ASEAN secretariat, which lies very far from its political counterpart in Europe – the 
European Commission. Severino (2011) argues that the relative weak nature of the ASEAN 
secretariat is so because the member states wish it to be so. If the ASEAN secretariat was 
strengthened, it would consequently mean a reduction in state sovereignty, which goes 
against one of the main interests of the member states (Severino, 2011). Based on this, it can 
be argued that further political integration among the AMSs expanding ASEAN to cover [...] 
all spectrum of our societies  [...] and [...] economically [...] move towards greater economic 
Katarzyna Magda Tarasiewicz, Rikke Lykke Andersen, Emil Matthews, Nikolaj Gedionsen  
Bachelor-project, Spring 2015 
International Studies  
Roskilde University 
Page 39 of 73 
integration (ASEAN b, 2014) is unlikely as long as they place a great weight on national 
sovereignty. 
Another legacy of the colonial times is the fact that many states are wary of dominance from 
great powers (Munakata, 2006; Higgott & Stubbs, 1995). This is again predominant among 
post-colonial states and impacts the national interests among the ASEAN+3 member states. 
Besides being a tool to enhance the East Asian regional voice, herein also ASEAN, the 
EAEC has been seen as a counterweight to US hegemony (Higgott & Stubbs, 1995). The 
EAEC was met with skepticism because it was argued that (especially by the US) an EAEC 
would threaten the Asia-Pacific relationship (ADB, 2015). ASEAN members do not wish to 
see themselves taken over by APEC (Higgott & Stubbs, 1995). By focusing on regional trade, 
it was argued that EAEC would reduce the effectiveness of APEC and thereby hinder further 
cooperation between Asia and the Pacific. US opposition to EAEC led to several states 
hesitating to give their support which in the end meant that the idea of an EAEC initially was 
abandoned (ADB, 2015). From this we can see that although there might be some credibility 
to US as a hegemon, being a driving factor for increased regionalism, here seen in the form of 
the EAEC, it is not a sufficient driving factor. The interest of keeping the US out of the 
region can rally some of the states in ASEAN together with their associates, but not all. This 
being said, from a purely economic point of view, ASEAN states would benefit more from 
participating in a PTA with APEC than an FTA within ASEAN, due to the wider economic 
participation that a PTA with APEC would bring (Sharma & Chua, 2000). Unlike ASEAN, 
Asia-Pacific represents a diversity, which complements economic growth and yet, ASEAN 
has chosen to strengthen East Asian economic ties through EAEC and ASEAN free-trade 
area (AFTA) over deeper integration within APEC. This would indicate that ASEAN’s move 
towards East Asian trade associations is not only driven by economic interests, but could 
have something to do with the US’s involvement in APEC.  
Sovereignty can be identified as a strong determinant for trade regionalism, specifically 
within ASEAN in the sense that it is the foundation for ASEAN’s focus on non-intrusive 
measures as seen in TAC and the weak nature of the ASEAN secretariat. Furthermore, the 
colonial legacy have caused member states of ASEAN+3 to be wary of external interference 
from great powers. Especially the role of the US has been analyzed in relation to the 
formation of ASEAN+3. Though there might be some credibility to anti US sentiment as a 
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driving factor for ASEAN+3 regional trade integration, it does not appear to be a sufficient 
explanation. 
AMSs chose to participate in regional trade initiatives in order to fight instabilities in 
form of hegemonic powers. 
Mansfield and Solingen (2010) argue that an increase in national activity towards regional 
integration in terms of trade can, to a large extent, be influenced by interest in shift from 
different types of regimes towards institutional homogeneity, as it potentially reduces 
instabilities in the region. Once there were very few solid trade arrangements in Asia what 
was, among other things, caused by significant discrepancies in institutional settings of the 
member states and led to large inequalities in terms of economic positions. However, due to 
progressing development of the Asian region, it became easier for states to join and carry out 
cooperative initiatives. During the last decades, Asian states have faced institutional changes 
which appeared to be an initial moment for closer regional cooperation (Mansfield & 
Solingen, 2010). The rise of a great number of trade agreements between countries could be 
the evidence of increasing interest in the unification of political regimes in the Asian region, 
which would consequently lead to closer cooperation within the trading system.  
According to some, FTAs are believed to increase member states’ security in international 
politics (Aggarwal & Govella, 2013; Pempel, 2013) For instance, AFTA established in 1992 
was a response to the post-Cold War rise of China, which led East Asian states to closer 
intraregional cooperation (Batalla, 2010) ASEAN, which follows the consensus approach, 
started to become dominated by domestic politics of particular countries, mainly China, 
Japan, and Korea and its forum gradually changed into a competition between these leaders. 
Voices against Chinese leadership in regional integration in particular, rose throughout the 
years and led to the opening of position of ASEAN towards negotiations. From this point it 
would negotiate with each of the Northeast countries individually in order to secure its 
independent position (Batalla, 2010).  
The majority of the AMSs considered the rising economic power of China a threat to their 
markets and production attractiveness. Increased volume of states entering FTA negotiations 
was to a large extent caused by ASEAN’s concern about its own economic independence 
(Weber, 2010). When People’s Republic of China (PRC) proposed to be the host of the East 
Asian Summit (EAS), [...] several countries began to form a coalition to oppose the proposal 
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(Batalla, 2010: 63). China, which shares national borders with fourteen states and has been in 
the center of international society, has great opportunities for trade. This has led to increased 
interest among the AMSs to limit China’s economic supremacy in order to strengthen their 
own economic positions. ASEAN+6, platform for multilateral cooperation between the 
member states together with China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand, 
established in 2005, was aimed at [...] striving for equilibrium, diversification, flexibility and 
check-and-balance as a means to avoid one regional leader from emerging (Szczudlik-Tatar, 
2013: 3).  
However, not all of the AMSs have perceived the rising power of China as a threat to their 
economic positions on the regional scene. Malaysia and Indonesia, for instance, consider 
China an actor capable of securing Asian region from the US influence. They have both seen 
the economic opening of China as an opportunity for obtaining a significant trade partner. 
According to Hans J. Giessmann, [...] they try to use closer cooperation to safeguard their 
self-determination in international affairs (2007: 6).  
All of the above indicates the attempts of the AMSs to avoid domination of a single power in 
the region, as it might have had a negative effect on trade relations among the states, through 
the discrimination of smaller economies. The creation of coalitions aimed at limiting the 
hegemonic power of China shows how ASEAN states place the preservation of their 
economic position in a regional trade system as an objective of entering cooperative 
initiatives. However, considering discrepancies in how different AMSs have been perceiving 
China’s economic position in the Asian region, the hypothesis regarding their participation in 
trade agreements in order to prevent instabilities should be revised. There are clear indicators 
behind the increased development of FTAs during last decades, being the result of threat for 
particular states’ positions in the region. However, this hypothesis can only be confirmed to a 
certain extent, as it has not been a tendency visible among all of the actors involved in the 
trade regionalism in ASEAN+3. 
Participating in regional trade agreements in the Asian region is motivated by interests 
in economic benefits. 
According to Mansfield and Solingen: Most states enter PTAs expecting to derive economic 
benefits (2010: 152). The vision of opening trade barriers between states in the region can 
create a promise of higher material revenues into the national economies, and thereby 
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convince them to join the initiatives. Therefore, even if a state has not considered 
participating in a particular regional trade agreement, it might chose to do so if staying 
outside of it seems less profitable than joining (Mansfield & Solingen, 2010). 
FTAs are the means of providing opportunities for large economic benefits through the 
expansion of the national markets, by the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers (Cheong & 
Park, 2008). Since FTAs involve close and policy-regulated cooperation between the 
involved actors, staying outside of an FTA can lead to economic losses. Such a trade 
marginalization could be the result of either not seeking trade agreements with big regional 
actors, or the presence of large bilateral and discriminatory co-operative initiatives in the 
Asian region, which do not offer cooperation to third parties. These possible consequences of 
non-participation in regional trading initiatives, have led the AMSs to seek FTAs not only 
within the Asian region but also outside of it, among states such as Australia and New 
Zealand. The objective was to find new export markets and therefore secure national 
economic positions undermined by the trade relationships taking place in the Asian region 
(ibid.).   
As predicted, the opening of national markets to bigger trading partners along with reduction 
of tariff barriers among the AMSs, has led to non-participating states being discriminated on 
the intraregional trade scene, by the discrimination blocs against non-members. In case of 
ASEAN+3, the export value among the member states increased by 20.34 percent, with 
simultaneous decrease in trade value among the non-members by 0.65 percent (ibid,). This 
data illustrates that member states’ predictions regarding the consequences of not 
participating in FTAs happened to be accurate, and therefore proves that economic interests 
have played a major role in their choice of entering intraregional trade agreements. 
National interests in strengthening states’ economies could be noticed in the joint statement 
of the ASEAN-Japan Commemorative Summit in Tokyo, 2003, “Hand in hand, facing 
regional and global challenges” (ASEAN, 2013), where the Heads of the member states of 
ASEAN and Japan expressed their concern about promoting co-operation in the Asian region. 
They recognized [...] the importance of a strong multilateral trading system (MTS) in 
safeguarding global trade expansion that serves as a source of economic development (ibid.). 
Later during that year, in “Vision Statement on ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation 
Shared Vision: “Shared Identity, Shared Future’”, they confirmed absolute commitment to 
further development of economic co-operation among the member states of ASEAN which, 
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according to the statement, led to meeting mutual interests regarding prosperity in trade 
(Mofa, n.d.). 
The past events indicate that the AMSs have, from the very beginning, been willing to form 
regional trade agreements in order to strengthen their national markets. In 1975 in Jakarta, 
where the first meeting of the ASEAN economic ministers took place, Singapore, the most 
developed member at that time, came up with an idea of the free trade zone (Kurus, 1995). It 
received a strong support from the Philippines, as both states considered the creation of free 
trade area an opportunity for their national markets: Singapore saw obvious trade advantages 
for itself while the Philippines had its own sights on industrialization expansion and an 
export market for its industrial goods (Kurus, 1995: 413).  
Since the 1990s a large number of Asian states expressed their interest in joining FTAs […] 
largely because of slow progress in market liberalisation under multilateralism (Yoshimatsu, 
2014: 2). Big volumes of trade between the AMSs and other trading actors can prove the size 
of economic benefits coming from Asian trade. In 2012 there was over 400 billion USD of 
trade flows under the ASEAN-China Free Trade agreement (ACFTA) only (Bhowmik, 
2014). During the last couple of years China has bought goods worth 141,554.3 million USD 
from ASEAN and thereby […] ASEAN’’s economies have met the fast growth (Bhowmik, 
2014: 41). The rising power of China after the end of the Cold War has been seen not only as 
a threat to AMSs’ position on the international scene, as concluded in the earlier part of the 
analysis, but also as an opportunity for expanding their markets. Since China’s economic 
opening and its increased motivation for regional trade cooperation, AMSs have been trying 
to benefit as much as possible using China’s market as a new source of profit (Giessmann, 
2007): [...] it has replaced US as the most important destination of exports of all East Asian 
countries (Cheong & Park, 2008: 87).  
All of the above indicates a relationship between searching for economic profits and 
participating in trade initiatives in the Asian region. Although, investigating whether material 
benefits represent the major determinant behind the AMSs’ interest in forming FTAs cannot 
provide a definite answer, hypothesis is strongly supported by the data. Strengthening 
national markets and economies is one of the main interests of every state. Regarding the data 
on how the number of FTAs in Asian region has increased throughout the years and how 
much profit they brought, an assumption of correlation between material benefits and 
entering trade agreements appears to be appropriate. 
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ASEAN member states consider regional trade agreements as promoting common 
security. 
There seem to be clear linkages between trade and security in the case of Asian regionalism. 
Power relations are determined by the efficiency of trade which, on the other hand, depends 
highly on the politics of the trading system. PTAs can highly contribute to the increase of 
trade performance and thereby create more national income, which subsequently leads to 
strengthening of states’ military powers. Therefore, trade creates ‘security externalities’. 
Through trading with allies, states promote common security and more peaceful relations 
within the region (Mansfield & Solingen, 2010).  
AMSs have repeatedly expressed their interest in developing regional cooperation, rather than 
supporting the leadership of particular powers. As analyzed above, this tendency has been 
particularly visible in the case of relations with China, which for decades has highly 
influenced international economic and political relationships in the Asian region. FTAs have 
repeatedly been used as a means of tightening economic ties between states, as they [...] 
deepen diplomatic relations in the government and intimate political relations (Yoshimatsu, 
2014: 5). There is less possibility of any conflicts between governments, which belong to the 
same trade agreements, therefore states might consider joining them in order to prevent any 
future disputes (Yoshimatsu, 2014). 
During the opening of the 9th China-ASEAN Expo in Southern China in 2012, Burmese 
president Thein Sein called for more economic cooperation between China and ASEAN, as 
he believes this is the means of improving peace in the region: The ASEAN-China Expo can 
enhance the China-ASEAN countries friendly relations (NTDTV, 2012). Since China’s 
economic and political reform in the 1980s, ASEAN stopped considering it a big ideological 
enemy, and during last 20 years, member states have entered a number of regional trade 
cooperation initiatives with China: In 2010 the trade volume between China and ASEAN 
increased 36 times (Bhowmik, 2014: 41). ACFTA, the world biggest free trade zone covering 
a combined GDP of around two trillion USD, was the result of mutual interests in improving 
the relationship between ASEAN and the Southeast Asian states. FTAs between China and 
ASEAN has been driven by a range of reasons, but the flashpoint for this cooperation was the 
members’ interest to [...] ensure a peaceful and stable environment (Wang, 2009).  
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Particular studies have focused on this relationship between trade relations and peacekeeping 
in the Asian region. They have shown that advanced bilateral trade interdependence between 
the AMSs and China, for instance, leads to less possibilities of military conflicts (Polachek 
1980; Polachek, Robst & Chang 1999). Considering the number of bilateral agreements 
between ASEAN and China, which during last decades have shown great involvement in 
maintaining mutual trust and regional stability, we can conclude that their choice of 
participating in regional cooperation have to a large extent been dictated by national interests 
regarding promoting peace in the region.  
China and Japan have perceived joining regional trading agreements as an opportunity 
to strengthen their positions and influence both inside and outside the Asian region.  
China and Japan, who currently are among the major global players in terms of political and 
economic influence on the international arena, have throughout the years played a significant 
role in East Asian trade. Their relations with ASEAN have developed gradually, as regional 
cooperation could not disregard such powerful political actors, which offered creating some 
of the world’s biggest FTAs. Considering this, the analysis of China’s and Japan’s national 
interests in entering such arrangements ought to be included, as it will most likely provide an 
insight into the mechanisms and determinants behind the regionalism of  trade in ASEAN+3.  
Compared to the ASEAN member states which, as seen throughout this part of the analysis, 
have considered entering FTAs an opportunity for fulfilling various national interests, 
especially China seems to show clearer motivations behind establishing close trade relations 
with the AMS. Furthermore, it has not only entered economic and political relationships with 
the AMS, but also other powerful actors, like South Korea, US and Japan. According to 
Yoshimatsu (2014), these relationships led to strong trade interdependence between China 
and Japan which has been highly influential on trade relations in the Asian region, hereunder 
ASEAN. In order to analyze the data which will help us test the given hypothesis, we first 
focus on Chinese national interests in joining trade agreements with ASEAN and then 
continue with the Japanese case. Furthermore, we will assemble analysis on both in order to 
discuss the strength of our hypothesis. 
In 2002 ASEAN and China agreed on a common free-trade zone. It was a starting point for 
the FTA negotiation, which came into force in 2005 in form of the ASEAN-China FTA, the 
first bilateral FTA with ASEAN in the Asian region (Cheong & Park, 2008). Although some 
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claim that China has been striving for political and economic leadership in the Asian region 
(Cheong & Park, 2008; Yoshimatsu, 2014; Yu, 2011), its representatives officially express 
willingness to leave the leadership in ASEAN-China FTA in the hands of the AMSs: We 
should continue to support ASEAN in playing the leading role in East Asia cooperation 
(Chineseembassy, 2005). Such discrepancies in how the position of China in the Asian region 
has been perceived and the position stated by the Chinese representatives, raises a question of 
what are the actual national interests of China in trade cooperation with ASEAN. 
The fact that China was the first non-member state to propose a bilateral FTA with ASEAN is 
one of the indicators of its strong will to participate in the regional trade arrangements. 
According to Webber (2010), the national interests of China have covered both the purely 
economic aspects and the promotion of friendly relations with the member states. One of the 
main objectives behind trade relations with the AMSs was to strengthen the development of 
Chinese economy. However, China has also shown concern about ensuring the trading 
partners of its absolute disinterest of becoming a hegemonic power in the region, which has 
been repeatedly recognized by the member states as a threat for their national markets 
(Webber, 2010).  
This view has been challenged by Yoshimatsu, whose study indicates that: China as a 
transitional hegemony pursues diplomatic objective to make East Asia a region under its own 
sphere of influence (2014: 6). According to his view, Chinese involvement in regional 
economic initiatives is a result of its interest in maintaining its position as a trade center in the 
Asian region. Other studies also link Chinese participation in cooperation with ASEAN with 
an objective to remain at the center of political and economic relations in East Asia (Cheong 
and Park 2008; Giessmann 2007). Chinese government has been focusing on creating a 
political framework able to ensure that China would hold the ruling power and dictate the 
intraregional relations. In order to do so it was crucial to look for new partnerships and new 
locations which would stay under the influence of China, whose national interest is to [...] 
ensure a continued influx of resources and capital; and to protect its market interests in 
export production (Giessmann, 2007: 3).  
Furthermore, according to Giessmann (2007), China has been aiming at spreading its political 
and economic power both within the East Asian region and outside of it, as FTAs can expand 
over the region borders. In case of Burma/Myanmar, China had used its dominant regional 
position to control the cross-border trade with Burma/Myanmar, where trade amounts grown 
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from around 16 million USD in 1984 to over 420 million USD in 2005 (Giessmann, 2007). 
The supremacy of China in intraregional relations regarding economic issues, like trade, 
shows that its actions have been dictated by its own interests in expanding its market and 
maintaining the position of an intraregional leader. 
In case of Japan, on the other hand, it has been much more difficult to isolate clear interests 
behind its participation in regional trade initiatives of the Asian region. Unlike China, whose 
actions indicate considerable interests in maintaining its leader position in Southeast Asia, 
Japan has been less radical in its actions during last couple of decades. According to Inkyo 
Cheong and Yung Chul Park (2008), there exists an assumption saying that the only interest 
Japan has had in engaging itself in FTAs, is to counteract the rising economic and political 
power of China and its influence on the AMSs. Economic integration and the idea of 
establishing a free trade zone in the region has not directly been in Japan’s interest. Before 
China and ASEAN signed their trade agreement in 2002 Japan had not shown any interest in 
participating or promoting an East Asian trade region, but wished to maintain its connections 
to the Western world (Yu, 2011). As mentioned before, this changed when China began to 
play a more significant regional role, but also because Asia emerged as one of the primary 
areas for economic growth, and Japan saw an opportunity to take advantage of this 
development (Yu, 2011).   
During the speech given in Singapore in 2012, the Prime Minister of Japan, Junichiro 
Koizumi expressed that the Japanese will to promote China’s economic and political regional 
power by saying: I would like to highly praise the active role China is willing to play in 
regional cooperation (ASEAN, 2012), and argued that the opportunities that China can offer 
to other Asian nations give them the possibility of a rapid economic development. However, 
this does not seem to be the case. Despite the small amount of Japanese trade initiatives and 
certain difficulties with establishing its national interests behind joining trade agreements 
with the AMSs, particular events can indicate certain objectives Japan has had in engaging 
itself in the abovementioned arrangements.  
Between the 1960s and 1990s, Japan was the economic superpower in the East Asian region, 
where it lay in the center of regional trade and investment. According to Yoshimatsu (2014), 
the general opinion on Japan’s low interests in regional trade cooperation ought to be 
challenged by the fact that Japanese leaders have strongly focused on maintaining the 
political and economic power in East Asia. Throughout the years, Japan has perceived itself 
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as playing the role of a leader of regional order, which it would support with its capital 
(Yoshimatsu, 2014). Since the 1990s, however, Asian countries have become more 
economically independent, what highly reduced Japanese influence and threatened its 
regional position. The threat to Japan’s position as an economic leader in East Asia was 
represented by the rising power of China, which led to Japan’s increased interest in the Asian 
trading system. Japan took a purely defensive position and since 2010 it […] pursues a 
diplomatic objective to enhance a political and security position by taking advantage of 
economic and trade policies (Yoshimatsu, 2014: 7). As Chinese influences expanded, Japan 
counteracted with the repeating proposals of cooperation with the AMSs. The number of 
trade agreements proposed by both Japan and China seem to prove these assumptions. In 
2000, Chinese premier at that time, Zhu Rongji, came forward with an idea of economic 
cooperation between China and ASEAN in form of an FTA (Batalla, 2010). It took Japan 
merely a year to counteract with its own proposal of an FTA with Singapore. When in 
November 2001 China and ASEAN agreed on establishing a free trade zone, Japanese Prime 
Minister expressed Japan’s will to create a Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (ibid.). 
The relationship between China and Japan has become a power struggle, using ASEAN and 
FTAs as a means of expanding economic and political influences in Southeast Asia. Cheong 
and Park (2008) claim that this struggle for regional leadership has been the major reason for 
both states to enter into trade agreements. Regionalism in East Asia has by Yu (2011) been 
characterized as being centered around ASEAN. This is however not due to ASEAN’s strong 
position in the region, but because of the power struggle going on between China and Japan. 
As long as neither Japan nor China can gain control over the region, ASEAN is allowed to 
[...] sit in the ‘driver’s seat’ for Asian regionalism (Yu, 2011: 624).  
After analysing the relationships that both Japan and China have had with ASEAN 
throughout the years, we can assess the strength of our hypothesis. The gathered data clearly 
show that the national interests of China have mainly been associated with gaining more 
political and economic power and thereby becoming the most influential actor in the Asian 
region. The same hypothesis regarding Japan however, can only be confirmed to a certain 
extent, as Japan only showed interest in closer cooperation with AMSs in face of the 
possibility of losing its influence for the benefit of China. 
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Part Conclusion  
Considering the data, which helped us assess different hypotheses discussed in this section of 
the analysis, we can observe that national interests of the ASEAN+3 members have played a 
significant role in their trade regionalism. There are certain differences between the strength 
of particular hypothesis, as some interests seem to have been more significant for states than 
another, when deciding upon joining regional trade agreements. The creation of ASEAN 
proved to be caused by AMSs’ will to separate the Southeast Asian region from the influence 
of the Western society, and thereby strengthen its own position on the global scene. It clearly 
shows their concern about national sovereignty being a major motivation behind forming the 
Asian trade bloc. 
Furthermore, analysis indicates that despite different political regimes and economic 
positions, members of ASEAN+3 present similar national interests behind entering trade 
agreements with other Asian states, the major being the possibility of economic benefits. 
However, certain discrepancies in how member states perceive security issues as 
determinants for regional cooperation, can be observed. Different positions towards the rising 
power of China seem to have influenced how particular ASEAN members have assessed the 
need of maintaining political and economic balance in the region by using PTAs. From 
Chinese and Japanese perspective, however, trade cooperation in ASEAN+3 seems to not 
only be the means of improving their economic situations, but also struggling for regional 
power.  
All of the possible determinants for trade regionalism in the case of ASEAN+3, being 
economic reasons, security issues, fighting economic and political instabilities, or a will to 
expand state’s influence across the region, have been to a certain extent confirmed during the 
process of analysing the data. The strength of particular analysis varies. However, regardless 
of the nature of these different motivations, data show that national interests undoubtedly 
play an important role in shaping trade regionalism among the members of ASEAN+3.  
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WQ 3: To what extent do institutions play a role in trade regionalism in 
ASEAN+3? 
After the Second World War, during the post-war period, the world began to experience a 
surge of development within the field of regional trade agreements. The era brought with it an 
increase in the creation and expansion of said agreements (Hafner-Burton, Pevehouse & 
Zierler, 2002). However, despite this increase in regional trade agreements across the world, 
in areas such as Europe, South America, and Asia, there remains little empirical knowledge 
concerning the operation of institutions within such regions (ibid.). In the following 
hypothesis we will argue that the lack of investigation into this aspect of institutions within 
regional trade agreements is an oversight, as they can have influence both on the state and 
regional level.  
Furthermore, we argue that particularly within ASEAN these institutions have an important 
role to play. ASEAN+3 is an example of an organization, wherein its member states have 
varying degrees of institutional development. A factor which, we argue, can play an 
important role for both the individual states within the organization but also for ASEAN+3 as 
a whole. 
From this argument and the data surrounding it, we have built three hypotheses: 
1. Many of the constituent states of ASEAN+3 have a lack of institutional quality, which 
has hindered them in terms of trade, but it is also a factor for ASEAN+3’s unfulfilled 
potential. 
2. Institutions are a framework with which public social and economic interests can be 
combined allowing state trade cooperation to flourish. 
3. Stable institutions with more consistent policies are more advantageous for trade and 
growth across various sectors. In addition to this they will also perpetuate better 
cooperation and relationships between the member states of ASEAN+3. 
 
Many of the constituent states of ASEAN+3 have a lack of institutional quality, which 
has hindered them in terms of trade, but it is also a factor for ASEAN+3’s unfulfilled 
potential  
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When we consider the individual member states within ASEAN+3, as with countries across 
the world, those that are considered the most successful tend to have the most stable and 
developed economies (UN, 2012). Recent research, has shown that the development and 
stability of economies, correlates with the quality of institutions in a particular state 
(Feenstra, Hong, Ma & Spencer, 2012). If we consider China as an example, a recent study 
regarding the role of institutions in the country has been conducted. The research [...] 
demonstrates the importance of institutional quality at the country level for both the volume 
of trade and the ability to trade in differentiated goods (Feenstra, Hong, Ma & Spencer, 
2012: 1). China gives us a very important indication of just how important institutions are 
within a state. China has experienced huge internal development within the last decade to 
become one of the superpowers of the world today. Since joining the WTO in 2001, China 
has experienced [...] tremendous growth in its exports (Feenstra, Hong, Ma & Spencer, 2012: 
1). In addition to its increase in exports, China has also experienced a simultaneous growth in 
institutionalization. The country has invested in the institutions within the trade and economic 
sector, which, as a result, have become more consistent and stronger. When we speak of 
strong institutions we identify with Christine Lagarde, the Managing Director of the IMF who 
says that they must be [...] capable of implementing and enforcing the law in accordance with 
its terms (2013). In addition to this, when we speak of weak institutions we imply that they 
are unable to do this. 
This increase in institutional development within China, could be considered a coincidence or 
side effect of the mass development that has occurred over recent years. However, a study 
states that [...] provinces within China that have stronger public institutions tend to attract 
more foreign investment (Feenstra, Hong, Ma & Spencer, 2012:2), solidifying the idea that it 
is institutions which increase economic development, and not the other way around. This 
correlation between institutions and economic development supports our hypothesis, that 
weak institutions have hindered trade for some of AMSs, such as Indonesia (ibid.).  
Through the data and the support this has given our hypothesis, we can go on to argue that 
institutions could be a determinant for why the AMSs decided to regionalize and form an 
organization, where they are able to work together. It is clear that institutionalization is an 
important factor to developing trade and stabilizing economies. Therefore, by joining 
ASEAN+3 and moving towards a regionalized trade system, individual states within Asia 
may be able to develop their own institutions (NTI, 2015). Joining ASEAN provides them a 
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potential platform, wherefrom they can co-operate with one another in order to help each 
other develop. This involves dividing tasks between constituent states, making institutional 
arrangements and [...] collaborating with national focal points and relevant institutions 
(ASEAN Secretariat a., 2014). One example of this could be the ASEAN+3’s plan to [...] 
establish regional and national project committees to coordinate project activities (ibid.) 
This shows a focus on states being able to place importance both internally, on their own 
institutions, and learning from other member states on how to develop them. Yet, also 
externally by creating national and regional institutions through ASEAN+3 that can benefit 
all, such as the ASEAN Regional Energy Outlook, Energy Policy, and Environmental 
Analysis (ASEAN Secretariat b., 2014).  
However, it is important to note that this is a potential result, it has not been entirely 
successful which may also be a reason for why, a number of scholars such as Narine (2001) 
and Achaya (2008), believe ASEAN+3 has not reached its full potential. There are still many 
member states which have comparatively weak institutions, and therefore are unable to 
implement and enforce these changes. Even China, which has many strong cases of 
institutionalized areas, has various regions with different levels of institutional development 
(Feenstra, Hong, Ma & Spencer, 2012). As is quoted in the paper ‘Contractual Versus Non-
contractual Trade: The Role of Institutions in China, [...] the mountains are high and the 
emperor is far away (Feenstra, Hong, Ma & Spencer, 2012: 2). This Chinese proverb is 
relevant both for China, depicting the vastness of the country and how it is difficult to ensure 
institutional quality across the entirety of it. Yet, it can also be related to ASEAN+3 as a 
whole. It is a difficult task to ensure institutional quality across so much space, but similarly 
also across so many individual member states and governmental systems. At this point in 
time, there exist states that are stronger and weaker institutionally, causing imbalances in 
ASEAN+3 as a result. Something, which is worth taking into account when we consider 
situations where it is commonly agreed that ASEAN has failed, for example the Asian 
financial crisis (Akya, 2006). This may be an example of where common institutional 
development could have helped prevent the problem that occurred. 
ASEAN+3 was formed in 1967, the organization was originally intended to serve as a 
security community, promoting social and political stability, while at the same time helping 
to bring the countries involved closer together and aiding them in cooperating with each other 
(ASEAN secretariat, 2014). However, as we state above, the organization is widely 
Katarzyna Magda Tarasiewicz, Rikke Lykke Andersen, Emil Matthews, Nikolaj Gedionsen  
Bachelor-project, Spring 2015 
International Studies  
Roskilde University 
Page 53 of 73 
considered to have failed in living up to its full potential (Palatino, 2013). Narine (2001) 
states that ASEAN+3 may [...] fade into irrelevance (2001: 193) and that it needs to become 
a unified, powerful voice for success to occur. Currently, ASEAN+3 is too preoccupied with 
the sovereignty of its member states. A factor Narine attributes to the individual member 
states within the organization being ‘institutionally weak’ (2001: 193), which has manifested 
itself in ASEAN+3’s inability to reform itself. Narine’s view on ASEAN+3 is also supported 
by the Acharya, who states that Asian regionalism remains under institutionalized (2008). 
However, Narine does concede that ASEAN still has the capacity to become a formal 
institutional structure of strength and consistency (2001). Knowing this, it is logical to argue 
that ASEAN+3 has been inhibited by the lack of institutional quality within its states, a stance 
that again is further supported by Narine who states that ASEAN+3 has been [...] limited by 
the capacity, legitimacy and stability of constituent parts (2001: 193). A factor which we can 
build on, arguing that the data and various authors conclusions, regarding the weak 
institutionalization of ASEAN+3 member states, supports our working hypothesis; that good 
institutional quality at the state level is an important factor of individual state success and 
stability. 
When we apply process tracing to our working hypothesis: ‘Many of the constituent states of 
ASEAN+3 have a lack of institutional quality, which has hindered them in terms of trade, but 
it is also a factor for ASEAN+3’s unfulfilled potential’, the data surrounding the hypothesis 
are very promising and highly supportive of the idea. As mentioned above, institutions are a 
fundamental part of states, regarding policy but also trade and economy. Strong and stable 
institutions, naturally promote growth and stability within a state (Feenstra, Hong, Ma & 
Spencer, 2012). Through the data, we have been able to identify and argue that through their 
influence on the [...] volume of trade and ability to trade in differentiated goods (Feenstra, 
Hong, Ma & Spencer, 2012: 9), institutions within states can be considered a determinant for 
the increase or decrease of trade. If a country is under institutionalized, it tends to also have a 
weaker economy and trade export, whereas the states with higher quality and more developed 
institutions, such as China, have seen increases in trade and their own economy. This 
promising evidence for the importance of institutions as a causal mechanism, means that we 
can argue for the legitimacy of our working hypothesis, however it is not able to confirm it. 
Although we are unable to unequivocally confirm our working hypothesis, we can argue that 
one reason for ASEAN looking, and being in the position it is in now, is due to a number of 
its member states being under institutionalized. 
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Institutions are a framework within which public, social and economic interests can be 
combined allowing state trade co-operation to flourish. 
Many states have begun to combine tackling social and public problems, by focusing on such 
areas as policy making, economy and trade - sectors which all have very much to do with 
institutions. For example, if we look at Indonesia, they have put forward a program called 
‘The Indonesian Trade Support Programme II’. Within this, they specifically focus on the 
development of economic and social sectors within Indonesia, while also improving the [...] 
coordination and transparency in the formulation and implementation of trade policies for 
export development (GRM International). However, despite wanting to improve the social 
and economic development of Indonesia, the details only map out investment and 
improvements in the institutional and economic sector. These, as we have argued for above, 
are inextricably linked. This leads us to believe that the government has identified a 
connection between institutions and the social sector. The program will tackle different areas 
within institutions and policies. However, by tackling these areas, they will also be able to 
improve the social side, lending support to our hypothesis, that the development of 
institutions will in turn develop other sectors within a state; both economic as we have 
already discussed but also the social.  
This tackling of institutions, with regard to the social aspect they can enhance, should be 
taken as a serious matter by states. Since, although they can aid various sectors, if not 
properly developed and of a high enough quality, institutions can also act as a form of 
constraint (Foot, 2012). Underdeveloped institutions can instead cultivate a negative 
reputation. As Rosemary Foot states, elaborates on this arguing that institutions become 
underpinned by the public's negative understandings and perceptions (2012). Perceptions, 
which she bases her primary argument around, saying that partly as a result of this, East 
Asian institutions have not been able to act as strong governmental mechanisms (Foot, 2012). 
An example of this could be the Thailand protests that occurred as senators debated the 
amnesty bill in 2013 (The Guardian, 2013). Thousands of protesters rallied around Bangkok 
to protest against the senators and institution, showcasing how the negative perception of an 
institution can suddenly inhibit it (ibid.). 
From the data displayed, we can argue that by investing in institutions, states naturally invest 
in the development of various other aspects of the state, namely social, public and economic. 
Far from inhibiting themselves, they actually propel themselves forwards, an argument that is 
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also supported by the findings regarding our first hypothesis ‘Many of the constituent states 
of ASEAN+3 have a lack of institutional quality, which has hindered them in terms of trade, 
but it is also a factor for ASEAN+3’s unfulfilled potential’. The data found, regarding this 
hypothesis, elaborates on the importance of institutional development with regard to other 
sectors, although in that case it is specifically economic. However, China remains another 
prime example of a state, which has realized that developing their institutions, will naturally 
lead to further development and better quality in other sectors. 
As a result of this data above and the importance it places on institutions regarding other 
sectors such as the social, one could argue that this could be a determining factor for why 
states such as Indonesia and China, chose to become a part of ASEAN+3. Although there are 
still existing difficulties, ASEAN+3 provides member states the opportunity to co-operate 
with other states; to work together and help each other develop and build a stronger 
regionalized system. ASEAN+3 provides states the potential to work together through 
regional co-operation. As the ‘German Institute of Global and Area Unions’ (GIGA) says, 
states can [...] cooperate to solve tasks and create improved conditions in order to maximise, 
economic, political, social and cultural benefits for all the participating countries (GIGA, 
2010: 8). Therefore, if joining ASEAN+3 can help states build upon their existing 
institutions, which we have found have a positive effect, then this would provide a major 
incentive to joining the organization and creating a system of regionalized trade. The increase 
in quality would lead to faster, more effective input from institutions, which would reach 
across and enhance all the various sectors. A factor, which is particularly relevant for states 
such as Indonesia. However, it still remains a valid one for countries such as China, as they 
still have room for further development, despite being further ahead when compared to other 
states in ASEAN+3. 
Stable institutions with more consistent policies are more advantageous for trade and 
growth across various sectors. In addition to this they will also perpetuate better 
cooperation and relationships between the member states of ASEAN+3. 
In the modern, globalized era of the 21st century, a debate has been raised as to which, a 
democratic or authoritarian regime, fairs better (Piccone & Miller, 2013). For the purpose of 
this project, when we consider democratic institutions we operate with the definition that they 
[...] contain certain traits: competitive, multiparty elections, freedom of speech and assembly 
and the rule of law (Kopstein & Lichbach, 2009: 4). In addition to this, we define 
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authoritarian regimes as states with an [...] absence of free elections and the presence of 
unconstrained power [...] the power and authority wielded by the leader(s) is not contingent 
upon popular support from the citizenry (Authoritarianism, 1999). Different leaders and 
scholars have different opinions on the debate. For example, Piccone and Miller argue that 
[...] the longer a country is ruled democratically, the better it performs across a variety of 
governance and development indicators, including economic performance (2013, n.p.). It is a 
viewpoint that some also hold in regard to ASEAN+3, some, such as Piccone and Miller 
(2013) would clearly suggest that the authoritarian states that exist, should swap to a 
democratic regime.  
Others also advocate for the further development of states such as Indonesia, Thailand and 
South Korea (Doody, 2015). In many cases it is a viewpoint that is becoming an 
actualization, within the last decade several Asian nations have rejected the presence of an 
authoritarian regime. Instead, shifting towards a more democratic form of government (NDI, 
n.d.). There are also theories and evidence to suggest that democratic regimes are more 
peaceful in their foreign affairs (Oxfordbibliographies, 2015). Ergo, if we build on this, and 
the recent events that have occurred, we can argue that the implementation of a democratic 
system, brings the potential of better relationships between states. In addition to this, there 
also exists argumentation that democratic systems place focus on the development of 
domestic political institutions, which as we have discussed, lend themselves to the 
development of other sectors within a state (ibid.). Therefore, democratic regimes are likely 
to invest in their own institutions, and develop these in order to create a more stable and 
efficient system. In addition to this, one can argue that they have a higher chance of better 
foreign relationships, due to their inherently peaceful approach to foreign affairs (ibid.). 
Piccone and Miller also speak of the [...] positive correlation between regime type and 
economic and social progress (2013, n.p.), a factor worth noting as it also lends credence to 
the previous hypothesis ‘Institutions are a framework within which public, social and 
economic interests can be combined allowing state trade co-operation to flourish’. 
Democratic systems, and thereby their institutions, naturally develop the economic situation 
of a country but also the social. 
Although there is significant evidence to suggest that democratic systems are the natural 
choice for any state, if they wish to develop institutions and encourage cooperation between 
states, it is also worth noting that authoritarian states can be successful. For example, China’s 
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incredible economic surge, has proved that authoritarian regimes can be every bit as 
successful as democratic regimes, in particular with regard to economic growth. The rise of 
China is a primary factor for the resulting debate over which regime type is best suited for 
economic growth (Piccone & Miller, 2013). However, it is not only economic growth alone 
that should be considered, but also the institutions of these states, when we consider regimes 
and their success. Democratic states need not necessarily be stable and consistent just because 
they have adopted a democratic system. A number of states within ASEAN+3, such as 
Thailand and Indonesia, are prime examples of this. As The NDI says, [...] countries such as 
Pakistan and Thailand have returned to elected governments after military rule, but continue 
to struggle with sustaining democratic institutions (2015, n.p.).  
Even the member states within ASEAN+3, that have managed to implement some state 
institutions, are still significantly under-institutionalized, as Acharya (2008) also argues. The 
institutions in place need not necessarily be stable and consistent in their policies. After all, 
many states have corrupted and inconsistent institutions, which only lends itself to the 
problems within the member states of ASEAN+3. For example, although countries, such as 
Thailand and Bangladesh, have adopted democratic regimes, they are still suspected of 
institutional corruption and, particularly Thailand, has suffered from protests and riots that 
only inhibit progress (The Guardian, 2013; NDI, n.d.). State problems, which only manifest 
themselves in ASEAN+3 making it more difficult to tackle problems that the organization as 
a whole faces, such as the financial crisis for example. 
Narine (2001) also brings in another important aspect to the debate of regimes. He broaches 
the subject that as states within ASEAN+3 [...] become more democratic, their leadership 
changes more rapidly, and the value of personal relationships between leaders is reduced 
(2001: 203). A point that is valid for the international scene, where these changes will no 
doubt bring inconsistency to the wants and demands of states involved. However, it will also 
bring with it the potential for internal problems as institutions, policies, etc. will no doubt also 
be influenced and changed frequently. A factor, which could lead to the constant demolition 
and development of institutions, resulting in institutions that constantly vary and change 
position on issues. Ergo, this constant shifting of priorities could be inhibiting for the 
individual states, but also for ASEAN+3 and the establishment of trade regionalism.  
Building on this, Narine also talks of the complications that come with democratic 
governments as they are [...] more susceptible to public pressure and have less room in which 
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to maneuver [and] the democratic states will find their own relationships deeply complicated 
by the realities of electoral politicians (2001: 203). An issue, which clearly, can bring further 
problems to a state but also cause hindrances with ASEAN+3, as states yet again are limited 
in their maneuverability. They may also make decisions on popularity and attaining short 
term support from their own country, although the outcome may not be beneficial in the long 
run. In addition to this, Narine identifies an another problem for ASEAN+3, arguing that as 
more and more states become democratic, tensions will continue to rise between these 
countries and the dictatorships that remain (2001).  
These two viewpoints differ on which regime is most successful and most suited to aid a state 
across various factors such as economic, social and institutional progress. However, we can 
argue that despite having very different viewpoints and methods of engagement, both see the 
importance in a stable and consistent regime. Since, we can argue that this in turn will result 
in stability across the country, particularly institutionally. A point which, as we have looked 
at in the previous hypotheses, has a positive effect on the growth of various aspects within a 
state, such as economy, society and trade. When we analyzed the second part of our 
hypothesis, ‘stable institutions will be able to perpetuate better cooperation and relationships 
between the AMSs’, we found that there is evidence to support it, particularly with Narine 
(2001). However, beyond this we felt that there was not enough evidence, clearly stating that 
there exists a link between strong institutions and better cooperation between the AMSs. It 
would make sense that such a link exists, as better institutional quality would allow for states 
to act with less inhibition within ASEAN+3. Nevertheless, there are still a number of member 
countries within ASEAN+3, which are considered institutionally weak such as Thailand, 
Indonesia, South Korea, etc.; but that have at the same time undergone cooperation with each 
other and other states within ASEAN+3. 
Part Conclusion 
When we consider our hypotheses, they all explore different areas of institutions in regard to 
regionalism and the effect that they have on the member states within ASEAN+3. However, 
what is noticeable is that each hypothesis discovers, and makes statements, that can be linked 
to the others. The most notable of these discoveries, is that institutions must be stable and of a 
high quality if they are to operate successfully. Yet, if this is achieved, individual state 
institutions have the capacity to influence and help develop a number of other sectors within 
a country, such as economic and social. However, when we consider the constituent states 
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within ASEAN +3, we find that there are a number of these that are under-institutionalized. 
Even those that have a relatively high level of institutional development, such as China, have 
room for improvement. Building on this we have found that weak institutions within a state 
can actually have an adverse effect and act as inhibitors for development. In addition to this, 
we argue that the weak institutions, within a number of ASEAN+3’s constituent states, have 
actually inhibited the organization itself and been a factor in its unfulfilled potential. 
ASEAN +3 provides a potential platform wherefrom regional cooperation can be achieved 
and through such a process, as is noted in the second hypothesis, the potential to create 
improved conditions can occur. From this regional cooperation, states can maximize 
institutional development, which will in turn also helps other sectors of the country such as, 
economic, social and cultural. A phenomenon that according to our sources would benefit all 
participating states. Therefore, we identify the major improvement across various sectors that 
can be attained through the improvement of institutions, as a major incentive for the member 
states of ASEAN 3 to become a part of the organization and advocating for trade regionalism. 
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Conclusion 
In our analysis we have identified economic growth to be a main determinant for regionalism 
within the ASEAN+3 member states. Despite several differences between the member states, 
one thing they all seem to agree on is the wish to enhance economic growth. Furthermore, in 
our analysis on institutions we have found that strong institutions can serve to enhance 
economic growth by facilitating an increase in export and FDI. Weak institutions on the other 
hand, can work as an economic deterrent which is the case with many states within 
ASEAN+3. We have found that by entering into regional agreements, states with weak 
institutions will be able to improve their institutions, thereby opening up for the possibility of 
increased economic growth.  
Most of the ASEAN+3 members share elements of history that has shaped their common 
culture, which in turn, has formed their approach to both regional and international 
cooperation. The ‘ASEAN way’ and the concept of ‘non-interference’ form the backbone of 
the ASEAN+3 member states’ modus operandi. Though we identified economic growth as a 
highly significant determinant for regionalism within ASEAN+3, the issue of strengthening 
the ASEAN+3 member states’ voice on a global level, have also played an important role. 
The wish to strengthen the regional voice might not be a sufficient factor for regional 
integration, but it can serve to tip the scale towards regional integration.   
The ASEAN member states’ colonial past have molded their shared concern in regards to 
their individual national sovereignty, a determinant that stands in the way of strengthening 
regional ties. The strong consensus among the AMSs, about maintaining sovereignty, has 
meant that ASEAN, as an institution, is kept at a relatively weak level, as exemplified by the 
ASEAN secretariat. Another determinant, is the fact that the pursuit of self-interest lies in the 
heart of the shared ASEAN norms. Furthermore, the ASEAN member states are characterized 
by ethnic, religious, and political factors that makes it hard for them to further develop a 
shared regional identity. Although we have found that an ASEAN+3 identity do exist, it is 
mainly confined to the region’s elite. 
In our analysis we have found that conflicts are less likely to occur among governments that 
participate in regional trade cooperation. This can serve to motivate regional integration and 
the formation of PTAs and FTAs. In addition, it has become clear that the ASEAN member 
states would rather support regional collaboration, than having a single leading state. 
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However, based on our analysis, Japan and China do not share the same view on regional 
cooperation. Besides increasing economic benefits, the two superpowers have worked hard to 
try to gain the position of the regional leadership, but none of them have managed to do so 
yet. We have found that ASEAN is allowed to maintain the role as the regional driver for 
integration because neither Japan nor China have been able to assert supremacy.   
In conclusion, we argue that the determinants of new trade regionalism in ASEAN+3, all play 
a role of varying degrees. One of the main drivers for trade regionalism within ASEAN+3 is 
the prospect of economic growth. For states with weak institutions, regional integration can 
be a tool to enhance the nation's’ institutional capability and thereby its economic growth. 
Furthermore, the region’s colonial past has meant that sovereignty plays a paradoxical role as 
both a cause and a deterrent of trade regionalism. Regional security can also work as a 
motivational factor for regional trade integration as conflict are less likely to occur among 
states with strong trade integration. Lastly, for China and Japan, power politics have been a 
determinant for regional integration and a means to enhance their position regionally.   
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Perspective 
Our chosen theoretical approach covers aspects, such as identity, interests, and institutions, as 
set out by Kopstein & Lichbach (2009), accompanied by our presented hypotheses, 
concerning trade regionalism in ASEAN+3. Originally, Kopstein & Lichbach’s theory was 
concerned with ascertaining specific domestic identities, interests, and institutions, within 
single specific states. In other words, if we had kept to the letter of the theoretical approach, 
we would have to, for example, identify specific institutions in the individual states that make 
up ASEAN+3, and present hypothesis concerning them. And then do generally the same for 
each aspect. Admittedly, that would have given a deeper understanding of regionalism, and 
its components, of ASEAN+3, perhaps even of regionalism in general. Unfortunately, this 
level of immersion would have been outside of the scope of this project. Yet, the use of 
Kopstein & Lichbach’s theory as a broader framework for our theoretical approach was still 
useful. 
In our project we apply a dynamic form of process tracing. Reflecting on this an interesting 
alternate route we could have taken, could have been to still use process tracing but use a 
stricter, more rigid structure throughout the analyse. In this sense we would have used 
specific tests and give a more specific assessment of our hypotheses strengths. A relatively 
small alteration but one that could have yielded interesting results. 
When applying our choice of process tracing during the analysis other hypotheses were 
developed and investigated, most specifically within the segment that examines the role of 
institutions within ASEAN+3. However, although we felt that a number of these hypotheses 
were interesting and could provide an interesting aspect to our project, we decided to remove 
them. This decision was made upon further investigation we decided against it. This decision 
was made after we delved deeper into the specific data. Upon further investigation we found 
that there was either too much data that rejected our hypothesis or as typically was the case, 
too little data in general. This meant that we decided to remove these hypothesis as we felt we 
could not draw strong or justifiable conclusions from these hypothesis. In hindsight however, 
if more data similar to that which was present could have been found they would have 
provided a valuable addition to our project. For example, one removed hypothesis was: 
‘Countries that exert strong governmental control over their own economy and trade tend to 
have less non-state and non-governmental institutional and actor influence”. If more data 
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could have been gathered on this hypothesis we could have introduced a greater focus on 
non-state/governmental institutions into our project. An area that could potentially prove just 
as relevant for trade regionalism as official governmental institutions. 
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